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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1 Introduction 
My dissertation contributes to auction studies in the field of Industrial Organization. 
An auction is a selling mechanism. To a seller, the motivation for using an auction as a 
selling mechanism is that bidders have one-sided private information. Because of the 
asymmetric information and the induced uncertainty, auctions help sellers to find the 
buyers who value their goods the most. From a social planner's point of view, auctions also 
can help allocate resources efficiently and achieve the social optimum. 
In practice, the implication of research on auctions is three-fold. First, plenty of 
goods and services are traded by auctions in the real world nowadays. For example, the U.S. 
traded volume through auctions will reach $660 billion according to the International Data 
Corporation 2002 report. Here are a few categories from an economist's point of view. (1) 
Consumer goods such as art, wine, fish and flower are often traded through auctions. (2) 
Public goods and utilities such as highway projects, electricity and oil drilling projects are 
often auctioned as contracts by the government. (3) Financial assets such as stocks, bonds 
and securities are also good examples. (4) Goods sold by online auctions are even more 
diverse. For example, you can bid for Staples coupons on eBay.com. Studies of auctions 
can help evaluate mechanisms in various auctions and improve the efficiency of the 
auctions. 
Second, auctions offer a testing ground for economic theory, for example, game 
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theory with incomplete information. Economic theories are often much more developed 
than empirics. One reason is lack of data. The other reason is the intensive computational 
burden incurred when we estimate structural parameters. On one hand, various auctions in 
practice provide economists easily accessible datasets. On the other hand, the structural 
econometric approach, which is an important tool for my dissertation research and which I 
will elaborate on later, helps us establish a link between game-theoretic models and 
empirical analyses. 
Third, the Internet greatly expands the auction market and accelerates its 
development. Demand for professional auction design is higher and higher. A recent 
example is the design for the auctions of the 3G mobile phone licenses in UK in 2000. The 
auctions of mobile phone licenses across the world are only the most famous new auction 
markets. This presents another reason for economists to develop theories and analyze data 
to guide auction practice. 
My dissertation is motivated by an interesting feature that I observed from the 
procurement auctions organized by the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT): 
many of these auctions are held with multiple rounds. This feature is attributed to the use of 
secret reserve prices in these auctions. Prior research has indicated that auctions with 
reserve prices sometimes lead to no transaction if no bidder can propose a price better than 
the reserve price.1 However, there are still chances of trade if bidders' values for the unsold 
objects change. Thus the seller can continue auctioning the unsold objects from the 
previous auctions. Previous research, however, has not paid much attention to this feature 
in auctions. My dissertation offers thorough theoretical and empirical analyses on 
                                                 
1See, for example, Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel and Vuong (1997), Bajari and Hortasu (2003), and Li and 
Perrigne (2003). 
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multi-round procurement auctions with reserve prices. 
According to the 1992 US Census of Construction Industries a total of $35.3 billion 
was spent during 1992 on highway and street construction activities. Auctions are adopted 
by departments of transportation in many states to sell construction contracts to firm 
contractors. However, auction mechanisms are heterogeneous across states. For example, 
the INDOT adopts a secret reserve price and announces it after the contract is successfully 
awarded. The California Department of Transportation adopts a secret reserve price, but 
never announces it. The Texas Department of Transportation uses an announced reserve 
price, but the reserve price is not binding. Heterogeneous policies motivate my research 
into government practice to help evaluate and improve the procurement auction process. 
My dissertation uses three chapters to study multi-round procurement auctions with 
reserve prices. In the first chapter, I develop a static model with non-forward looking 
bidders. I make this assumption to simplify the analysis and to accommodate the flexibility 
of allowing for changes of bidders' private cost distributions across stages. I first propose a 
game-theoretic bidding model in multi-round procurement auctions with secret reserve 
prices and evaluate how the release of the auctioneer's reserve price affects bidders' 
bidding behavior and auctioneer's expected payment. Then I provide various reduced-form 
analyses on the INDOT data to validate the model. 
In the second chapter, I maintain the assumption of myopic bidders and carry out a 
structural econometric analysis on the multi-round procurement auction data from the 
INDOT. Using the structural estimates, I evaluate how the release of the reserve price 
affects the government's expected payment through a counterfactual analysis. 
In the third chapter, I introduce dynamic features into the model by assuming that 
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bidders are forward looking and their private cost distributions do not change across stages. 
I propose a dynamic bidding model. Then I solve a bidder's dynamic control problem to 
obtain the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium. Next, I develop a two-step estimation 
approach to conduct a structural econometric analysis on the dynamic multi-round 
procurement auction game. Then I use this approach to analyze the data from the INDOT. 
Lastly, using the estimates of the inferred cost distribution, I evaluate the reserve price 
policy through counterfactual analysis. 
To model the multiple stages and secret reserve price, I focus the first-price 
sealed-bid auction model on a simple environment -- the independent private value (IPV) 
paradigm. I also restrict my attention to bidders' strategic changes over stages, while 
assuming that the government's reserve price is exogenous and private over stages. This 
assumption, although restrictive, is consistent with the data.2 While the model focuses on 
the procurement auctions that are low-bid auctions, as it is motivated by the procurement 
data from the INDOT, it can be readily extended to high-bid auctions. 
My model yields some interesting predictions and implications. First, the bidding 
prices uniformly decline over stages, because of the information about the secret reserve 
prices revealed in the previous stage. This prediction holds regardless of whether the 
bidders are forward looking or not. Second, bidders mark up higher when placing bids with 
forward looking than without forward looking. This reflects the bidders' opinion of 
winning today versus winning later. Third, I study the reserve price release policies in the 
static model by simulation. Under some specifications, a secret reserve price is better than 
a public reserve price, and vice versa. 
                                                 
2According to the officials at the INDOT, generally no change is made in the engineer estimate (as the reserve 
price) after a round of unsuccessful auction and in practice there were very few changes made. Hence the 
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My structural analyses recover the inferred costs, the use of which allows us to 
evaluate the reserve price policy in the current procurement auction mechanism. I conduct 
counterfactual analyses. I find that on one hand when the bidders are not forward looking, 
to help the INDOT save budget, the use of a secret reserve price is better than a public 
reserve price. On the other hand, the result depends on the discount factor, in other words 
the bidders’ attitude about the future, when the bidders are forward looking. When the 
discount factor is low, the use of a secret reserve price is better. When the discount factor is 
high enough, the use of a public reserve price is better. 
My dissertation contributes to the study of structural auction models and the policy 
of procurement auctions. First, its theoretical finding has potential to explain why secret 
reserve prices are widely used in practice. Second, it is the second study of dynamic 
structural econometric auction models. Jofre-Bonet and Pensendorfer (2003) give the first. 
Lastly, it offers insights into the highway procurement auctions policies. 
 
2 Multi-Round Auctions and Reserve Prices: A Survey 
Since Vickrey's (1961) seminal work, studies of auction theories have grown 
rapidly. See surveys by Milgrom (1985, 1987), McAfee and McMillan (1987), Wilson 
(1992) and Klemperer (1999). The reserve price, as an important policy instrument in 
auctions, has drawn a lot of attention. Reserve prices, if binding, may lead to no trade. 
Multi-round auctions can therefore be attributed to the use of reserve prices in auctions. I 
investigate research on these issues one by one. I also provide a short survey on studies of 
auctions in a dynamic setting as well as studies of highway procurement auctions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
reserve price is the government's knowledge rather than its dynamic strategy. 
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2.1 Reserve Prices in Auctions 
There are various reasons for a seller to use a reserve price in auctions. Most 
importantly, setting a reserve price can protect the seller from a profit loss. Basically, there 
are two reserve price policies, namely a public reserve price when it is announced and a 
secret reserve price when it is kept private to the seller. The focus of my dissertation is on 
secret reserve prices as they are used in the INDOT auctions. Secret reserve prices are 
widely used. Use of secret reserve prices in auctions has been studied in empirical work. 
Hendricks, Porter and Wilson (1994) study the Outer Continental Shelf auctions. 
Ashenfelter (1989) examines wine and art auctions. Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel and Vuong 
(1994, 1997) and Li and Perrigne (2003) find secret reserve prices are used in timber 
auctions. Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) study eBay coin auctions with endogenous entry and 
empirically compare the two reserve price policies in these auctions. 
Theoretical work in studying secret reserve prices, however, has been limited, with 
exceptions such as Vincent (1995) using risk aversion to explain the use of secret reserve 
prices in a common value paradigm and Li and Tan (2000) in an independent private value 
paradigm. They show that in the presence of risk aversion, using a secret reserve price is 
better for the seller than using the optimal public reserve price for single-round auctions 
under some conditions. Alternative explanations have also been provided through the 
seller's objectives other than maximizing profits such as maximizing the expected sales as 
in Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel and Vuong (1994). Hiding reserve prices may also help the 
auctioneer deter collusion from bidders as explained in Ashenfelter (1989). In addition, as 
argued in Bajari and Hortacsu (2003), secret reserve prices may be used to encourage 
participation in auctions with entry. 
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The theoretical study of the seller's optimal reserve price strategy is often in a 
relatively simple environment. See e.g., Riley and Samuelson (1981) find the optimal 
reserve price in first-price sealed-bid auctions within IPV paradigm, and Laffont and 
Maskin (1980) solve for the optimal public reserve price in second-price auctions. 
Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel and Vuong (1994) also find the optimal secret reserve price in a 
one-shot first-price auction. The empirical study of auction data in complicated 
environment, on the other hand, often treats the seller's reserve as exogenous and 
concentrates on analyzing bidding. See e.g., Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) and Jofre-Bonet 
and Pesendorfer (2003)'s study of repeated games of highway auctions. 
 
2.2 Multi-Round Auctions 
Studies of multi-round auctions have been quite limited. Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel 
and Vuong (1997) study a two-round auction game where the first round is conducted as a 
first-price sealed bid auction with a secret reserve price, and if the object is not sold, the 
second round is conducted through bargaining between the seller and the bidder with the 
highest bid from the first round. Horstmann and LaCasse (1997) propose a common value 
second-price bidding model in which the seller is assumed to know the true common value 
and has the option of holding the auction for a one-time resale. The seller announces a 
reserve price for screening inferior bids but does not guarantee a sale in the first round 
auction. Skreta (2004) proposes a new concept, namely non-commitment, which is the 
same as in my research. Under non-commitment, if no trade takes place, the seller cannot 
commit not to try to sell the object in the second period. Skreta studies a two-period auction 
model. The seller can implement a revenue maximizing allocation rule by running a 
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Myerson auction with buyer-specific cutoffs in each period. The reserve price decreases 
overtime if no trade takes place. Evidently, these models do not fit with the multi-round 
procurement auctions organized by the INDOT as these auctions can be held for more than 
two rounds if the project is not sold in the previous round, and the government does not 
strategically choose to re-auction the project. 
 
2.3 Dynamic Auction Models 
The literature on empirical estimation of auctions has largely focused on a static 
auction setting. Paarsch (1992), Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995), and Guerre, Perrigne 
and Vuong (2000) among others develop empirical approaches in static auction games. 
Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel and Vuong (1994, 1997) and Li and Perrigne (2003) empirically 
analyze the use of secret reserve prices in static auction games. There is little empirical 
work on dynamic auction games with an exception of Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003). 
Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer develop an estimation approach of a dynamic auction game 
with capacity constraint as the state variable to analyze the California highway auctions. 
Laffont and Robert (1999) and Donald, Paarsch and Robert (2002) also analyze finitely 
repeated auctions. Recently, Athey and Bagwell (2006) study dynamic auctions with 
persistent private information. 
 
2.4 Applications in Highway Procurement Auctions 
As one of the main applications in the empirical auction literature, highway 
procurement auctions have inspired a great deal of research. Early studies are Feinstein, 
Block and Nold (1985) and Porter and Zona (1993) who study issues of bidder collusion. 
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Bajari (1997) studies asymmetry between bidders. For recent structural work in analyzing 
procurement auctions, see Bajari and Ye (2002) for detecting collusion, Hong and Shum 
(2002) for assessing the winner's curse, Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) for capacity 
constraints in dynamic procurement auctions, Krasnokutskaya (2002) for the effect of 
unobserved auction heterogeneity in an asymmetric first-price IPV paradigm, and Li and 
Zheng (2005) for entry and competition effects. 
It is worth noting that unobserved auction heterogeneity in procurement auctions 
has been documented (e.g. Krasnokutskaya (2002) and Li and Zheng (2005)). Failing to 
control for the unobserved auction heterogeneity can cause severe bias in structural 
estimation, and hence result in misleading policy evaluations and recommendations. My 
structural approach takes into account the unobserved auction heterogeneity. 
 
3 Structural Econometric Approach: A Survey 
In contrast to the large number of theoretical auction studies, fewer empirical 
studies have attempted to validate theoretical auction models using real auction data. A 
possible reason for this gap between theoretical and empirical work arises from the 
computational difficulties due to the nonlinearity and numerical complexity associated 
with the estimation of structural econometric models. Most empirical studies concentrate 
on testing some implications of the theory of auctions using reduced-form econometric 
models, such as linear regressions. See the recent survey by Laffont (1997). 
The main methodology of the reduced-form approach is to test the comparative 
statics predictions from the theoretical models, without directly recovering the parameters 
of bidders' value distribution (so called underlying structure). The advantage of this 
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approach is that it is computationally easy. The disadvantage is that it is hard to interpret 
the estimates because it lacks connection to the theoretical auction model. Without 
primitive parameters, it is also hard to further simulate alternative mechanisms in 
comparison to the current mechanism. Therefore further analysis calls for the structural 
econometric approach. 
My dissertation mainly uses the structural approach. Nevertheless I use 
reduced-form when it is necessary to present a fast and intuitive test of the theoretical 
model as well. In subsequent sections, I provide a brief survey on the auction literature in a 
static setting on one hand as it is well developed in auction studies. I present the literature 
on a broader class of empirical industrial organization models in a dynamic setting on the 
other hand as there have been very few empirical studies of dynamic auction models. 
 
3.1 Literature on Static Models 
The earliest structural static econometric auction models are Paarsch (1989, 1992) 
who estimates econometric models that are closely derived from theory. In recent years, we 
have seen various studies that have well established this area. I briefly review the methods 
that have been very useful in estimation and testing. 
One strand of methods is within a parametric framework. This line of research 
specifies the distribution of the unobserved private values in some finite dimensional 
parameter space. Then it uses observables to derive a likelihood function or moment 
conditions. Structural parameters are estimated by methods in the family of maximum 
likelihood or generalized method of moments (GMM). Since the boundary of the observed 
equilibrium bids often depends on the parameters of the distribution of the latent values, 
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the standard maximum likelihood approach is inappropriate. Donald and Paarsch (1993) 
propose a piecewise maximum likelihood estimation method to overcome this difficulty. 
However, using likelihood and moment conditions of bids requires the computation of the 
equilibrium bidding strategy which is complicated as a closed-form solution is often not 
attainable. As a resolution, Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995) propose the simulated 
non-linear least squares estimation method using winning bids. Li and Vuong (1997) 
further extend this method to the framework of using all bids. This method does not require 
to solve the equilibrium bids and has great computational advantage. Recently, Hong and 
Shum (2002) propose a monotone quantile estimator for first-price sealed-bid auctions 
including both a private and a common value component. Li (2005) proposes a method of 
simulated moments for the first-price sealed-bid auctions with entry and binding reserve 
price. 
The other strand of research is within a nonparametric framework. Guerre, Perrigne 
and Vuong (2000) show that the latent values are non-parametrically identified from the 
observed bids in the first-price IPV auction models. They establish a general two-step 
non-parametric framework to recover the distribution of the values. In the first step, it 
estimates the distribution of bids. In the second step, relying on the first order condition for 
the optimal bids, it obtains the inferred values and uses these values to non-parametrically 
fit the distribution of values. The implication of this method is two-fold. First, the estimates 
obtained from this method are robust as it is non-parametric. Second, it has computational 
advantage because it does not require the computation of the equilibrium bids. The main 
disadvantage of this method is that the rates of convergence are slower than  N   as is 
typical of non-parametric methods. In addition, if there are many covariates, it is 
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impractical. Following this line of research, Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel and Vuong (1994, 
1997) analyze the first-price IPV model with a secret reserve price. Li, Perrigne and Vuong 
(2000, 2002) propose non-parametric identification and estimation methods for the 
first-price affiliated private value auction models and conditionally independent private 
information auction models. Athey and Haile (2002) provide more non-parametric 
identification and testing results for a variety of auction models. Hong and Shum (2003) 
propose a non-parametric test of common values versus private values. Athey and Haile 
(2005) provide an excellent survey on the non-parametric structural approach. 
 
3.2 Literature on Dynamic Models 
In contrast to the well-established structural approach in analyzing static auction 
games, there is far less structural empirical work on dynamic auction games. There are a 
few exceptions. Laffont and Robert (1999) and Donald, Paarsch and Robert (2002) analyze 
finitely repeated auctions. Laffont and Robert consider a sequence of auctions in which an 
identical object is sold at each stage. Their model generates complex intra-day dynamics 
that are applied to data on eggplant auctions. Donald, Paarsch and Robert consider a model 
in which a finite number of objects are sold in a sequence of ascending-price auctions. 
They estimate the model using data on the sales of Siberian timber-export permits. 
Jofre-Bonet and Pensendorfer (2003) estimate a dynamic repeated highway procurement 
auction game with capacity constraint as the observed state variable. They propose a 
two-step estimation method. In the first step, it estimates the distribution of bids. In the 
second step, it recovers the cost distribution relying on the first order condition of bids. A 
complication in estimating a dynamic model is to approximate the value function 
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numerically. 
Jofre-Bonet and Pensendorfer's approach builds partially on the two step approach 
that Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel and Vuong (1994) and Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2002) 
develop for static models. The main contribution of their paper is to extend the estimation 
method to dynamic auction games. In their paper, the dynamic auction model seeks to find 
a symmetric Markovian equilibrium which shares the property as in Rust (1987). The 
conditional independence assumption in the data generating process is necessary to adopt 
the framework of Markov dynamic decision processes. See Rust (1994) for a detailed 
survey on the structural estimation of Markov decision processes. See also Pakes (1994) 
for a survey on the literature of estimation in dynamic games. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
A GAME OF MULTI-ROUND AUCTION WITH SECRET RESERVE PRICE 
AND NON-FORWARD LOOKING BIDDERS 
 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I propose a game-theoretic bidding model in multi-round 
procurement auctions with secret reserve prices and evaluate how the release of the 
auctioneer's reserve price affects bidders' bidding behavior and auctioneer's expected 
payment. Then I carry out various reduced-form econometric analyses on the multi-round 
procurement auction data from the INDOT to validate the model. 
To analyze the complexity of multiple stages and secret reserve price, I establish 
my first-price sealed-bid auction model in a simple environment -- the independent private 
value (IPV) paradigm. Meanwhile, I assume that the government's reserve price is 
exogenous and private over stages. This assumption, although restrictive, is consistent with 
my data. It also permits me to focus on bidders' strategic changes over stages 
Although my model for the procurement auctions focuses on low-bid auctions 
which is motivated by the procurement data from the INDOT, it can be easily generalized 
to analyze high-bid auctions. My model yields some interesting predictions and 
implications. First, the bidding prices uniformly decline over stages, because of the 
information about the secret reserve prices revealed in the previous stage. Second, under 
some conditions, hiding the secret reserve price is better for the government than 
announcing it. This result provides an explanation as to why secret reserve prices are 
commonly used in auctions from a new perspective. 
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The implication of the reduced-form analyses is two-fold. First, it validates the 
important assumptions in the model, such as the exogeneity of reserve prices and number 
of potential bidders. Second, it tests first the equilibrium bidding monotonically decreasing 
in cost and second the bid in the second round is lower than in the first round. 
Studies of multi-round auctions have been quite limited. A few existing studies are 
all limited to a two-round auction model with various seller's second-round options. See 
Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel and Vuong (1997), Horstmann and LaCasse (1997), and Skreta 
(2004). Apparently, these two-round models do not fit with the multi-round procurement 
auctions organized by the INDOT as these auctions can be held for more than two rounds if 
the project is not sold in the previous round, and the government does not strategically 
choose to re-auction the project. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present the data to motivate the 
model. In Section 3, I construct the model of multi-round procurement auctions with secret 
reserve prices, and solve the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. I also investigate the implications 
from my model. In Section 4, I compare the effects of different information release policies. 
In Section 5, I conduct a reduced-form econometric analysis of the data. Section 6 
concludes. All technical proofs are included in the Appendix. 
 
2 Data 
My dissertation analyzes a data set of highway auctions held by the INDOT. The 
INDOT lets highway construction contracts through auctions. The auctions are held as 
first-price sealed-bid auctions where the INDOT reserve prices are unknown to bidders. 
Each contract specifies the construction work on highways within Indiana undertaken by 
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the winner of the auction. The winner of each auction performs projects described in the 
contract and is paid by the government. The prices bid by all participants are the amount 
that they ask for compensation. 
An auction proceeds as follow. The INDOT posts the notice to contractors to invite 
bids five weeks prior to the bidding day. The notice includes simple information such as 
the type of projects in each contract, date of completion requested, and the length or area of 
the projects. Bid proposals and plans for the contracts that consist of more information on 
characteristics of the projects are also available upon request. Next, with the advent of the 
bidding day, each bidder submits a sealed bid to an electronic bidding system knowing that 
the government has a secret reserve price. Finally, on the bidding day, the received bids are 
unsealed and ranked by the government publicly. If the lowest bid in the auction is lower 
than the reserve price, the contract is then awarded to the bidder. Otherwise the contract 
will be readvertised and reauctioned in the following month. This feature makes the data 
unique. 
The INDOT lets four types of construction work: road work, bridge work, traffic 
facilities and highway maintenance. I select one specific type of bridge work, which is 
called bridge rehabilitation, to analyze for two reasons. First, there exists large 
heterogeneity across different auctions. The characteristics of bridges are relatively more 
observable to econometricians among all work. Second, among all bridge work, bridge 
rehabilitation work not only reveals most characteristics to econometricians but also occurs 
most frequently. 
The sample analyzed in this paper is from INDOT monthly lettings from 
September 1996 to December 2004. For each auctioned contract, I have the following 
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observations: the identity of each bidder, all bids, the reserve price, the number of bidders, 
the number of projects, the length of projects, the number of working days (or the 
completion date), the DBE goal and the structure of the bridge.1 Before I exclude the 
lettings whose descriptive variables are missing, I have 37 lettings that have two rounds of 
auctions. In 34 lettings, the contractors in the second round are a subset of the contractors 
in the first round. There are three lettings, however, all of which have one single bidder in 
the first round and one new single bidder in the second round. I exclude them from my 
sample. I also exclude from the sample the lettings whose descriptive variables are missing. 
As a result, my final sample consists of 273 lets and 1428 bids in total. Among the 273 lets, 
243 were sold in the first round that involves 1261 bids. There are 30 lets unsold in the first 
round (near 12.5%) but sold in the second round with totally 167 bids in both rounds, and 
102 bids in the first round, and 65 bids in the second round, respectively. 
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 give the description of the variables and the summary 
statistics of the data. On average, DBE percentage is 7.52 which means 7.52% of the total 
value of the contract is operated by DBE firms. DBE is regulated by the government hence 
it is not the choice of bidders. The average number of working days for completing the 
bridge work is around 138. The average length of the projects is 79.21 meters (about 260 
feet). Intuitively, the longer a project takes and/or the longer the bridge is, the more work 
needs to be done and hence the higher cost it could result in. The average number of 
projects in each contract is 1.18, meaning that there can be multiple projects on vicinity 
                                                 
1DBE (short for disadvantaged business enterprise program) is committed by the INDOT to implement to 
ensure nondiscrimination in the award and administration of USDOT-assisted contracts. DBE goal is 
expressed as a percentage. This percentage, when applied to the total federal highway construction funds 
received by the INDOT during the year, represents the amount of dollars that DBE firms working on INDOT 
contracts as prime contractors, subcontractors, or truckers should receive. Hence in a particular letting, the 
primary contractor if not a DBE firm, has the responsibility for contracting all ready, willing and able DBE 
firms who express a desire to work on any of the pay items of the contract; and must subcontract at least as 
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sites. Multiple projects could potentially affect the capacity as well as the share ability of 
the facilities of the firms. 38% of the bridges have a steel structure, with the rest having 
structures of concrete, wood and others. 
The summary statistics also reveal several important features of the data. On 
average, the number of bidders in the first round is 4.99 whereas the number of bidders in 
the second round is 2.23. Second, the average reserve price is $855,615 and the average bid 
is $839,506 for those with only one round. The former is greater than the latter meaning 
that the secret reserve price is effectively binding. On the other hand, they are very close. 
Third, if I concentrate on the auctions with two rounds, I find that on average, the bid is $ 
638,917 in the first round and $588,992 in the second round, with a difference of $49,925. 
This indicates that bids on average are lower in the second round than in the first round. 
 
3 The Model for Multi-Round Auctions with Secret Reserve Prices 
In this section, I propose a game-theoretic model for multi-round procurement 
auctions with secret reserve prices, and derive the corresponding Bayesian-Nash 
equilibrium. 
 
3.1 Setup of the Game 
The government lets a single and indivisible contract to firm contractors. There are 
N  potential contractors who are interested in bidding for the contract. Each potential 
bidder is risk-neutral with a disutility equal to his private cost c . The government has an 
engineer estimate that is secret and serves as a reserve price in that the lowest bid has to be 
below it to become the winning bid. Because of the secret reserve price, it is possible for a 
                                                                                                                                                 
much as the required percentage of the total value to one or more DBE firms. 
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project not to be awarded in an auction. If this is the case, the project will be re-auctioned 
later. Thus the game has multiple stages. 
The government's secret reserve price 0r  is drawn from a distribution )(⋅G  with 
support ],[ cc  where .0≥c   )(⋅G  is twice continuously differentiable and has a density 
)(⋅g  that is strictly positive on the support. Potential bidders draw their private costs 
independently at stage j  from a common distribution denoted )(⋅jF  with support ],[ cc  
and the corresponding density )(⋅jf  that is strictly positive on the support.2 Thus I focus 
on the independent private value paradigm. When forming his bid, each bidder knows his 
private cost c , but does not know 0r  as well as others' private costs. On the other hand, 
each bidder knows that 0r  is drawn from )(⋅G  and all private costs are independently 
drawn from )(⋅jF . )(⋅G  and )(⋅jF  are common knowledge to all bidders. As a result, all 
bidders are identical a priori and the game is symmetric. 
More specifically, the game can be characterized in the following order. In the first 
stage, the government has an engineer estimate that serves as the reserve price. The reserve 
price is kept fixed and secret until the contract is sold. It is exogenous in that it is not related 
to the government's optimal and strategic decision. As a result, I can focus on the strategic 
changes of the bidders' strategies across stages. Without knowing the reserve price, all N  
potential bidders participate in the game in the first stage and submit their bids. At the end 
of the first stage, all bids are opened, ranked and released. The reserve price, however, is 
not made public until after the contract is sold out. If the lowest bid, which requests the 
                                                 
2While we assume that )(⋅G  and )(⋅jF  have a common support for simplicity, our approach can be readily 
generalized to the general case where )(⋅G  and )(⋅jF  have different supports. 
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least compensation of cost from the government, is lower than the reserve price, the 
contract is awarded to the associated bidder and the game ends. Otherwise, the game 
continues to the next stage. 
In the second stage, there are two main changes. First, each contractor re-draws his 
private cost from a common distribution )(2 ⋅F , which in general can be different from 
)(1 ⋅F . This is a key assumption in my model, and will be labeled as the random cost 
replacement assumption hereafter. This assumption implies that each bidder's cost in one 
auction round can be different from his in another. Being endowed with the lowest cost in 
the first round does not mean being endowed with the lowest in other rounds. This 
assumption can be used to justify my observation that in most of the auctions in my data, 
the actual bidders of the second round are a subset of the bidders in the first round. 
Moreover, the assumption that each bidder re-draws his private cost in a different round is 
reasonable. Each firm can participate in several different auctions in one month. They may 
lose in some auctions while winning in others. In a later round, the firm's private cost for 
the same project can change from the previous round because the firm may face different 
capacity constraints and may have different opportunity costs. 
Another important feature of my model is that there is a Bayesian updating on the 
reserve price from the bidders. Specifically, when an unsold project is re-auctioned, though 
the engineer's estimate is still kept secret, bidders have more information about this secret 
reserve price in this round than in the preceding one as they know the lowest bid from the 
preceding round. Therefore, they take this lowest bid into their strategy calculation as 
additional information as they know the secret reserve price has to be below this lowest bid. 
If a potential bidder's private cost he re-draws in this new round is above the lowest bid 
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from the preceding round, he will not submit his bid. Thus this lowest bid plays a similar 
role to that of a public reserve price in screening bids. Thus, though I assume that there is 
no entry problem in the first round in that all potential bidders submit their bids, in the 
subsequent rounds, a potential bidder will not submit his bid if his private cost is higher 
than the lowest bid he observes from the preceding round. As a result, the actual bidders in 
the subsequent rounds must be a subset of the potential bidders of the first round. 
 
3.2 The Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium Bidding Strategy 
Denote a bidder's cost at the j -th stage jc  and the associated bidding strategy .jb  
I focus on the symmetric increasing Bayesian-Nash bidding equilibrium. Define the 
equilibrium bidding function as )( jj cb β=  such that .0)( >⋅′β  I also use ∗js  to denote the 
lowest bid in the j -th stage. 
In this chapter, I assume that bidders solve their bidding strategies stage by stage 
without considering possible future rounds at the current round.3 Under this assumption 
and the random cost replacement assumption, I can derive the bidder's Bayesian-Nash 
equilibrium across stages as follows. 
 Proposition 1 The Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategies are  
,
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for the first round and 
                                                 
3This assumption rules out forward-looking bidders. On the other hand, it has a generality in that it allows for 
different private cost distributions across different rounds, while one has to assume the same private cost 
distribution across stages in a dynamic game with forward-looking bidders. 
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for the j-th reauction round respectively. 
 
3.3 Comparing Bidding Strategies across Stages 
Expressions (1) and (2) indicate that the bidding strategies differ from stage to stage 
in my model, and the interval over which the bidding strategy is defined also changes over 
stages. For instance while the first round equilibrium is defined on ],[ cc , the second round 
equilibrium is defined on the interval ],,[ 1
∗sc  which is  truncated from above compared to 
the first round. While the secret reserve price is not revealed, the rejected lowest bid from 
the previous round gives bidders information that the secret reserve price is below this bid; 
bidders will not submit their bids above this lowest bid. Intuitively, this would make 
bidders bid more aggressively and reduce their bids over stages. This is indeed the case, as 
shown in the next proposition. 
 Proposition 2 In the multi-round auction model, the equilibrium markup and bid in stage 
j  is less than or equal to the equilibrium markup and bid in the previous stage everywhere 
on ],[ 1
∗
−jsc . 
A few remarks follow. First, this proposition shows that the equilibrium bidding 
strategies are indeed decreasing from stage to stage if the contract is not sold out. Moreover, 
the reduction is universal on the whole common interval. Second, this result is established 
allowing the private cost distributions to vary across stages. Thus it is a strong prediction 
from the model as it is robust to the change of the bidders' cost distribution over stages. 
Third, this result is empirically testable and can be used for testing rationality of bidders in 
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real auctions. 
 
3.4 Numerical Examples 
To explore more properties of the bidding functions across stages, I give some 
numerical examples. I specify different distributions and vary the number of potential 
bidders. As the analytical solutions are in general not attainable, I numerically solve for 
equilibrium bids. Without loss of generality, I illustrate )(1 cβ  and ).(2 cβ  The bidding 
functions under different specifications are depicted in Figure 2.1 -- 2.3. 
The depicted curves reinforce two main findings from the theoretical model. First, 
the bidding functions are strictly increasing. Second, the bids in the second round are 
everywhere below the bids in the first round on the common support. I conduct a large 
number of numerical specifications and these findings are generally consistent. 
The graphs also reveal some other interesting patterns. First, the bids are negatively 
related to the number of potential bidders in every round. This is simply because of the 
competition effect. Second, the disparity between )(1 cβ  and )(2 cβ  are affected by two 
factors. On one hand, it is affected by the number of potential bidders. The difference 
between them shrinks as the number of potential bidders increases. This is reasonable 
because as the number of potential bidders increases, the competition effect becomes more 
intense, which makes a bidder's mark-up in every auction round small and converging. On 
the other hand, it is affected by the lowest bid in the first round of unsold auction. The 
smaller this lowest bid is, the larger the difference between )(1 cβ  and ).(2 cβ  I label this 
effect as boundary effect. In the first round, the boundary condition is at the upper bound of 
the cost distribution, while in the second round the boundary condition is at the previous 
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lowest bid (upper bound of a truncated distribution). The lower the truncated bound is, the 
lower the maximum possible bid in the second round is. Hence the boundary effect tends to 
enlarge the difference in bidding across stages. 
 
4 Government's Information Revelation 
In this section I compare welfare impacts of different reserve price release policies 
from the government. Motivated by the INDOT data feature, my model has focused on the 
use of the secret reserve price by the government. Alternatively, the government can make 
the engineer's estimate public and use it as a public reserve price. In this scenario, the 
government can find no bids submitted if all bidders' private costs are above the public 
reserve price. If I maintain the random cost replacement assumption, then the government 
can re-auction the project in the next round with the same public reserve price. As a result, 
under the random cost replacement assumption, the multi-round feature can be 
accommodated by both secret and public reserve prices. It would be interesting to compare 
the welfare implications of these two mechanisms and gain insights on why secret reserve 
prices are used in auctions. 
 
4.1 Multi-Round Auctions with Public Reserve Prices 
I maintain all the assumptions made in Section 2.1 except that now the reserve price 
r0  is public. In the j -th round, the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy, as shown in Riley 
and Samuelson (1981), is given by 
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for 0rc < ; for a potential bidder whose private cost is above 0r , he will not bid. 
If all potential bidders' private costs are above 0r , no bids are submitted at the 
current round, and the project can be re-auctioned in the next round. As in the secret 
reserve price case, I assume that the set of potential bidders remains the same across stages. 
At each round, however, a bidder's bidding strategy as defined in (3) may change because 
of the new private cost he re-draws from )(⋅jF . 
 
4.2 The Comparison of Mechanisms 
I compare the government's ex ante expected payments under the two reserve price 
policies, assuming that bidders re-draw their private costs at each round, and the 
government will re-auction the unsold contract in the next round until it is sold out. Since it 
is infeasible to make such a comparison generally as the ex ante expected payments in 
these two cases do not have closed form expressions in general, I conduct some simulation 
studies by assuming that the private cost distribution remains the same across stages, and 
by considering some commonly used functional forms for the private cost distribution and 
the reserve price distribution such as the uniform and exponential distributions. 
I specify different distributions and vary the number of potential bidders to carry 
out a group of simulations. I then compare the government's expected expenditures under 
the two mechanisms. 
I first plot the simulated expected expenditure as a function of the reserve price. As 
can be seen from the graphs, under some specifications, the secret reserve price policy 
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dominates the public reserve price in that the (ex post) expected expenditure under the 
secret reserve price is below that under the public reserve price. Some other specifications, 
however, yield the opposite findings. I further compute the ex ante expected expenditures 
by integrating out the reserve prices and report them in Table 2.3, which reveals that the 
expected expenditure under secret reserve prices is sometimes lower and sometimes higher 
than under public reserve prices. 
The graphs also reveal some other interesting patterns. First, the (ex post) expected 
expenditure as a function of either a secret or public reserve price is almost increasing with 
the reserve price4. This is reasonable because the higher is the reserve price, the less 
restrictive is the auction to the bidders. The acceptable bids are high when the reserve 
prices are high. Second, the effect of the number of bidders is complicated. On one hand, 
the larger the number of bidders, the closer the two curves are because of the competition 
that tends to offset the different effects of different reserve prices on bidding. This 
competition effect is in analogy to that in the earlier numerical results on equilibrium bids 
between stages. On the other hand, the minimum bid in the previous round is lowered by 
the intensity of competition in the case of a secret reserve price. This is a factor that drags 
down the bids in the auctions with secret reserve prices, which does not exist in the public 
reserve price mechanism. The boundary effect favors the secret reserve price. It affects the 
position of the intersection and the difference of the two curves. Consequently, the 
boundary effect tends to enlarge the favorable range for the secret reserve price and 
increase the distance between the two curves in its favorable range. The net effect is 
determined by the combination. It seems from the graphs that the competition effect often 
                                                 
4The sampling variation resulting from simulations causes the small fluctuations on the curve; otherwise the 
curve could be more monotone. 
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dominates. 
 
5 Reduced-Form Empirical Analyses 
In this section, I provide a preliminary analysis of my data, trying to relate my 
theoretical model to the data by justifying some assumptions, and to test some predictions 
from the model.5 
 
5.1 Exogeneity of Number of Potential Bidders in the First Round and the Reserve 
Price 
 
In my model, I assume that there is no entry in the first round. In other words, the 
set of potential bidders is identical to that of actual bidders. To justify this assumption, I 
take a look at the number of bidders in the first round and test the exogeneity of this 
variable. To this end, I use both the Poisson model and the negative binomial model as the 
number of bidders is a count variable. Using all data in the first round including both sold 
lettings and unsold lettings, I estimate both models. Since in my data set, I do not have any 
auction that has no bidder participation, the number of bidders in my data is truncated from 
zero. Thus I use the truncated Poisson and negative binomial models. 
The ML estimation results of both models are reported in Table 2.4-2.5. The results 
show that no covariates used in the regression are statistically significant in explaining the 
number of bidders. Thus, the number of actual bidders can be treated exogenous and 
considered the same as the number of potential bidders. 
Another important assumption in the theoretical model is that the government's 
reserve price is exogenous in that it is not related to the number of bidders and does not 
                                                 
5While our model is general enough to allow for possibility of infinite rounds, we can only focus on analyzing 
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change across different rounds. To test the exogeneity of the reserve price in my data, I run 
a regression of the logarithm of the reserve price on a set of covariates including the 
number of bidders. From the results reported in Table 2.6, I can see that interestingly, both 
the number of bidders and the round-two dummy are not significant in the regression.6 
That both the number of bidders and round-two dummy have no effect on the reserve price 
provides support for the exogeneity of the reserve price. 
 
5.2 Regression Analysis of Bids 
There are two empirically testable implications about the equilibrium bids from my 
theoretical model. First, it can be easily verified that the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium 
strategies given by (1) and (2) are monotone decreasing with the number of potential 
bidders. Intuitively, the larger the number of bidders, the more competitive the auction. 
The competition drives the bidders to bid more aggressively. Second, the theoretical model 
predicts that the equilibrium bids are lower in the second stage. 
To test these two implications, I run a pooled regression of the logarithm of bids on 
a set of covariates. To allow for structural change in bid over the two auction rounds, which 
is indicated by the theoretical model, I include the round-two dummy variable and its 
interactions with other variables. I report the regression results in Table 2.7. It turns out that 
the number of bidders is strongly significant and negatively related to bids. The round-two 
dummy and some interactive terms are strongly significant, meaning that there exists 
structural change in bid across auction stages. Furthermore, I calculate the marginal effect 
of the round-two dummy on the bids. The marginal effect is -$53004 and strongly 
                                                                                                                                                 
the first two rounds because of our data limitation. 
6round-two is a dummy variable equal to 0 when an auction is in the first round and 1 when an auction is in 
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significant, meaning that on average the bidders tend to lower their bids in the second 
round by $53,004 which is about 8.3% of the project value. This result is quite close to the 
outcome in the summary statistics. These findings offer support to my theoretical model. 
The 2R  of the pooled regression is 0.51, indicating that on one hand the model fits 
moderately well, on the other hand I may ignore some unobserved auction heterogeneity. 
To further ascertain the existence of unobserved auction heterogeneity, I conduct a 
random-effect panel data analysis using only the first round auction data, as the auction 
data have a panel feature. I report the regression results in Table 2.8. The results strongly 
indicate that there exists unobserved auction heterogeneity as the error variance from the 
unobserved heterogeneity accounts for 95% of the total error variance. Hence it calls for 
controlling the unobserved heterogeneity in the structural inference. 
 
6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I study multi-round auctions with secret reserve prices. My model 
yields some predictions that can be empirically tested, such as that the equilibrium bids 
decline uniformly over various stages. Also, my simulation study of the model 
demonstrates that depending on the specifications of the underlying distributions, the 
auctioneer may be better off by keeping the reserve price secret, which is the case in my 
data that motivates my study. Thus my model has the potential to be used to explain why, 
in some real world auctions, secret reserve prices are used. 
This chapter offers insight on the use of secret reserve prices in multi-round 
auctions and the strategic changes in bidders' bidding strategies. It is worth noting, on the 
other hand, that my model is a static model with non-forward looking bidders. I make this 
                                                                                                                                                 
the second round. 
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assumption to simplify the analysis and to accommodate the flexibility of allowing for 
changes of bidders' private cost distributions across stages. Alternatively, one can 
introduce dynamic features into the model by assuming that bidders are forward looking 
and their private cost distributions do not change across stages. In chapter IV, I propose a 
dynamic model of multi-round auctions with secret reserve prices and develop a structural 
approach. 
 35
 
APPENDIX 
1. Lemma 1 
In the first stage, bidder si′  probability of winning is )](1[)](1[ 111 iNi bGcF −− − ; while in 
the j -th stage, bidder si′  probability of winning is  
)(
)]()([)](1[
1
11
1
∗
−
∗
−
− −−
j
ij
N
ijj
sG
bGsGcF
.  
Proof Bidder i  wins the auction if his bid is less than the other 1−N  bids as well as the 
reserve price. The probability of winning can be described by the probability of the 
occurrence of the following event, )(minPr( 11 kiki bb ≠<  and )01 rbi < , which is a joint 
probability. Because the pair wise independence of agents, it is a product of )Pr( 01 rbi <  
and .),Pr( 11 ikbb ki ≠∀<  At equilibrium if the bidders play the symmetric bidding strategy, 
then )()( 11 ki cc ββ <  implies .11 ki cc <  Hence it follows that 
)(1)Pr(1)Pr( 111111 iikki cFcccc −=>−=< ,  
).(1)Pr(1)Pr( 11001 iii bGbrrb −=<−=<  
In the j -th stage, the information from previous auction rounds enables the bidders to 
form a Bayesian updated belief of .0r  Therefore the probability that ijb  is less than 0r  is 
contingent on the past information set 1−Λ j , i.e., )|Pr( 10 −Λ< jij rb , where ∗−1js  is the 
lowest bid from the previous auction round. Henceforth ,10
∗
−< jsr  is the information set 
.1−Λ j  bidders bid as if they saw 0r  drawn from a truncated distribution ).|( 1∗−< jsrrG  It 
then leads to the following result 
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Similarly, the probability of winning is based on )(minPr( kjikij bb ≠<   and  ),0rbij <  a joint 
probability. Thus the result immediately follows. 
 
2. Proof of Proposition 1 
Define )(⋅β  as the symmetric increasing Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bidding strategy. 
Since it is the same function for each bidder, we can suppress the subscript .i  We index the 
strategy in j -th stage by .jβ  We solve the game stage by stage to obtain the separate 
equilibrium. In the first stage, the bidder chooses 1b  to maximize his expected payoff 
)](1[))]((1)[( 1
1
1
1
11111 bGbFcb
N −−−= −−βπ  . The first order condition is as follows 
)())]((1)[()](1[))]((1[ 1
1
1
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1111
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0
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1111 =′−−−−− −
−−−
b
bfbFNbGcb N ββββ , 
where )(11 cb β=  and ).( 111 bc −= β  After we replace 1b  with the function of c , we get the 
differential equation for 1β  
)()()](1)[()()](1[)](1[ 11
1
1111
1
1 cgcFccGcF
NN ′−′− −−−−− βββββ  
0)()](1)[1))](((1)[)(( 1
2
111 =−−−−− − cfcFNcGcc Nββ . 
Further algebra turns the differential equation into 
))]}((1[)](1{[))]}((1[)](1)[({ 1
1
11
1
11 cGcFdc
dccGcFc
dc
d NN βββ −−=−− −− . 
Using the boundary condition  cc =)(1β , we can solve the equation above and get 
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In the j -th reauction stage, the bidder maximize his expected payoff in the j -th round as 
follows 
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The corresponding first order condition is 
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In equilibrium, we obtain the differential equation for jβ   
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0)()](1)[1))]((()()[)(( 21 =−−−−− −∗− cfcFNcGsGcc jNjjjj ββ . 
Then it can be written as 
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The boundary condition is different here. It involves participation decision of the bidder’s 
entry to the j -th round auction occurs only if a bidder's private cost in j -th round is less 
than ∗−1js . Hence the above strategy is conditional on that the private cost is less than 
∗
−1js . 
As a result, the boundary condition is ∗−
∗
− = 11 )( jjj ssβ  for this stage. Integrate over ],[ 1∗−jsc , 
using the boundary condition, we can get the following 
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3. Proof of Proposition 2 
By the uniqueness of symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium solution of (1) and (2), we 
have 
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Since  ,21 css jj << ∗−∗−   it immediately follows that 
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Furthermore, from (A.1) we can get 
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that is 
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From (A.2) and (A.3), we have 
))(())(( 12121
∗
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−− −−≥−− jjjjjj GGcGGc ββ . 
Therefore it follows that ).()( 1 cc jj −≤ ββ   
 40
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Bajari, P., AND A. Hortacsu (2003): “The Winner's Curse, Reserve Prices and Endogenous 
Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions,” RAND Journal of Economics, 34, 
329-355. 
 
Elyakime, B., J. J. Laffont, P. Loisel, AND Q. Vuong (1997): “Auctioning and Bargaining: 
An Econometric Study of Timber Auctions with Secret Reservation Prices,” Journal of 
Business Economics and Statistics, 15, 209-220. 
 
Horstmann, I. J. AND C. LaCasse (1997): “Secret Reserve Prices in a Bidding Model with a 
Resale Option, American Economic Review,” 87, 663-684. 
 
Jofre-Bonet., M., AND M. Pesendorfer (2003): “Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game, 
Econometrica,” 71, 1443-1489. 
 
Laffont, J. J. AND E. Maskin (1980): “Optimal Reserve Price,” Economic Letters, 6, 
309-313. 
 
Riley, J., AND W. Samuelson (1981): “Optimal Auctions,” American Economic Review, 71, 
381-392. 
 
Skreta, V. (2004): “Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment,” Working Paper, 
University of Minnesota. 
 
 41
 
Table 2.1 Variables and Number of Observations 
number of lets with one round  243 
number of lets with two round  30 
Variable Description NOBS
characteristics of lets   
Dbe DBE percentage goal 273 
Time number of working days needed 273 
Np number of projects 273 
Steel whether the bridge is of steel structure 273 
Length length of the bridge(s), meter 273 
Prices   
Rp government's engineer estimate 273 
bid1 for lets with one round 1261 
bid1&2 for lets with two round (both rounds) 167 
bid1-2 bid in the first round auction that is unsold 102 
bid2-2 bid in the second round 65 
participation   
Nb number of potential bidders 273 
nb2 number of bidders in 2nd round 30 
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Table 2.2 Summary Statistics 
Variable mean std.dev. min max 
Dbe 7.52 3.16 0 15 
Time 137.53 65.76 20 451 
Np 1.18 0.60 1 5 
Steel 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Length 79.21 82.27 3.22 607.31 
Rp 855614.8 895489.2 70671.35 6742284 
bid1 839506 869855.5 65325.78 6684512 
bid1&2 619485.5 398895.8 94853 2230051 
bid1-2 (first round) 638917.3 427400.6 94853 2230051 
bid2-2 (second round) 588992.4 350553.3 97637.2 1505183 
Nb 4.99 1.98 1 10 
nb2 2.23 1.01 1 5 
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Table 2.3 Results of Simulation Study 
 )(cF    )(rG    N   public rp secret rp 
exp (1) exp (1) 4 0.0388 0.0341 
exp (1) exp (1) 7 0.024 0.0228 
exp (1) exp (1) 10 0.0174 0.0172 
exp(2) exp (1) 10 0.0306 0.0281 
exp(0.5) exp (1) 10 0.0092 0.0096 
exp(0.3) exp (1) 10 0.0056 0.0062 
exp(0.3) exp(1) 7 0.0082 0.0086 
unif [0,1] unif [0,1] 4 0.2911 0.2662 
unif [0,1] unif [0,1] 7 0.2032 0.1958 
unif [0,1] unif [0,1] 10 0.1554 0.1543 
unif [0,0.3] unif [0,1] 10 0.0519 0.0586 
unif [0,0.5] unif [0,1] 10 0.0838 0.0886 
unif [0,0.7] unif [0,1] 10 0.1138 0.1174 
exp: exponential distribution, mean in parentheses 
unif: uniform distribution, bounds in brackets 
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Table 2.4 Poisson Regression Model of NB 
nb (Dept. Var.) Coef. Std. Err. 
dbe 0.0161 0.01 
time 5.07e-04 4.31e-04 
np -0.0505 0.0513 
steel 0.042 0.0608 
length 3.59e-04 3.82e-04 
_cons 1.42* 0.104 
Observations: 273    Log likelihood: -567.24 
restricted log likelihood  -573.42 
chi2(d.f.=5) = 12.37  p-value = 0.03 
left truncated data, at nb=0 
*: significant at 5% 
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Table 2.5 Negative Binomial Model of NB 
nb (Dept. Var.) Coef. Std. Err. 
dbe 0.016 0.01 
time 5.08e-04 5.21e-04 
np -0.0504 0.0653 
steel 0.042 0.073 
length 3.59e-04 3.37e-04 
_cons 1.42* 0.13 
Observations: 273    Log likelihood: -567.24 
left truncated data, at nb=0 
*: significant at 5% 
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Table 2.6 OLS Estimates of Regression of Reserve Prices 
log(rp) (Dept. Var.) Coef. Std. Err. 
nb -0.011 0.011 
round-two -0.12 0.12 
dbe 0.045* 0.011 
time 0.005* 0.0005 
np 0.204* 0.060 
steel 0.273* 0.073 
length 0.0024* 0.0004 
_cons 11.84* 0.149 
Number of Observations: 273                           52.2 =R   
*: significant at 5% 
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Table 2.7 OLS Estimates of Regression of Bids 
log(bid) (Dept. Var.) Coef. Std. Err. 
round-two -0.826* 0.4113 
nb -0.020* 0.0068 
dbe 0.037* 0.0053 
time 0.0048* 0.0002 
np 0.191* 0.0387 
steel 0.272* 0.0337 
length 0.0024* 0.0002 
nb*round-two 0.0504 0.0481 
dbe*round-two 0.006 0.0197 
time*round-two -0.001 0.0016 
np*round-two 0.681* 0.1560 
steel*round-two -0.340 0.2276 
length*round-two 0.0005 0.0005 
_cons 11.927* 0.0809 
marginal effect  )( 12 bb −   -5.3e+04* 3.1e+03 
Number of Observations: 1428                   51.02 =R   
*: significant at 5% 
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Table 2.8 Random Effect Analysis of Bids 
log(bid) (Dept. Var.) Coef. Std. Err. 
nb -0.0214 0.016 
dbe 0.039* 0.011 
time 0.0047* 0.0005 
np 0.201* 0.060 
steel 0.265* 0.073 
length 0.0024* 0.0005 
_cons 11.91* 0.14 
 5346.02 =uσ    1179.02 =εσ    
 9536.0=ρ   (fraction of variance due to  u ) 
Number of Groups: 273 
Model:  llll iii uxbid εβ ++=)log(   
*: significant at 5% 
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Figure 2.1 Bidding Functions of the First Two Stages in Multi-Round Auctions with 
Secret Reserve Prices: Uniform Distributions 
 
Note: The contractors’ private cost and the governmental reserve price are uniformly 
distributed. In each subplot, b refers to contractor, g refers to government, N refers to 
number of contractors and S* refers to the lowest bid in the first round of an unsold 
contract. We maintain the convention of notations throughout the figure set 1. 
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Figure 2.2 Bidding Functions of the First Two Stages in Multi-Round Auctions with 
Secret Reserve Prices: Exponential Distributions 
 
Note: The contractors’ private cost and the governmental reserve price are exponentially 
distributed. 
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Figure 2.3 Bidding Functions of the First Two Stages in Multi-Round Auctions with 
Secret Reserve Prices: Mixed Distributions 
 
Note: Weib refers to weibull distribution; Beta refers to Beta distribution; logn refers to 
log normal distribution. In each subplot, the contractor’s distribution is put in the first 
place. 
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Figure 2.4 The Comparison of Governmental Expenditures under Uniform Cost 
Distributions 
 
 
Note: solid lines represent (ex post) governmental expenditures under public reserve 
prices, dash lines are under secret reserve prices. 
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Figure 2.5 The Comparison of Governmental Expenditures under Exponential Cost 
Distributions 
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CHAPTER III 
 
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF MULTI-ROUND PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS 
WITH NON-FORWARD LOOKING BIDDERS 
 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter, following the game-theoretic model in Chapter II, I carry out a 
structural econometric analysis on the multi-round procurement auction data from the 
INDOT. Using the structural estimates, I evaluate how the release of the reserve price 
affects the government's expected payment through counterfactual analysis. 
To analyze the procurement auction data, and in addition to provide an empirical 
framework within which the multi-round model with secret reserve prices can be analyzed, 
I develop a structural model from the theoretical model that I propose. My structural 
approach takes into account of the unobserved auction heterogeneity, the existence of 
which in procurement auctions has been documented (e.g. Krasnokutskaya (2002) and Li 
and Zheng (2005)). Failing to control for the unobserved auction heterogeneity can cause 
severe bias in structural estimation, and hence result in misleading policy evaluations and 
recommendations. 
I adopt the method of simulated moments (MSM) to estimate the underlying 
structural parameters. This approach provides a unified framework within which some 
interesting hypotheses can be tested, in addition to the computational advantage in 
obtaining consistent estimates. For example, we can test whether the private cost 
distribution varies across stages. I use my structural approach to analyze the INDOT data. 
Using the structural estimates, I carry out a counterfactual analysis by simulating the 
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auctions with different government's reserve price release policies in the multi-round 
scenario. I find that the government could save more than $13,000 (or about 2.5% of the 
project value) on average on a representative bridge work auction by hiding the engineer 
estimate rather than disclosing it. Hence the use of secret reserve price may be a good 
policy in practice in procurement auctions. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, I provide a structural 
econometric framework for analyzing multi-round auction data. In Section 3, I apply the 
structural approach to analyze the INDOT data. In Section 4, I use counterfactual analysis 
to evaluate the government's reserve price policy. Section 5 concludes. All technical proofs 
are included in the Appendix. 
 
2 Structural Inference of Muti-Round Auction Models 
 
2.1 The Parameterization of the Structural Model 
Based on the theoretical auction model, there are three primitives, namely, the 
government's reserve price distribution )(⋅G  and the private cost distributions )(⋅jF , 
2,1=j . )(1 ⋅F  can be in general different from )(2 ⋅F . Nonparametrically, )(⋅G  can be 
identified from the observed reserve prices as they are assumed to be random draws from 
)(⋅G . Moreover, following Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) and Li and Perrigne (2003), 
it can be verified that )(1 ⋅F  is identified over its entire support ],[ cc  by the observed bids 
in the first round, and )(2 ⋅F  is identified over ],[ 1∗sc  by the observed bids in the second 
round (see the appendix for a discussion). In this paper, however, I adopt the parametric 
approach because I only observe 30 auctions in the second round, which makes 
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nonparametric estimation problematic. 
In an econometric framework, asymptotic statistical inference is based on a large 
number of auctions. Let 1L  be the number of auctions in the first round, 2L  be the number 
of auctions in the second round. Some auctions in 1L  did not result in a sale and went into 
the second round. For the l -th auction at the j -th round, let )(⋅lG  and )(⋅ljF  denote each 
primitive distribution respectively with corresponding densities )(⋅lg  and )(⋅ljf , 2,1=j . 
Assume that ),,|( γlll uxGG ⋅=  and ),,|( jj uxFF θlll ⋅= , where lx  is a vector of 
variables that I use to control for the observed auction heterogeneity, and lu  is a scalar 
variable that represents the unobserved auction heterogeneity, both affecting the 
government's reserve price as well as the bidders' costs, γ  is a vector of unknown 
parameters in KR⊂Γ , and θ  is a vector of unknown parameters in .R K⊂Θ  I assume 
that u  is independent of x , and has a distribution )|( σ⋅W  with )|( σ⋅w  being the density 
function, where σ  is a vector of unknown parameter in .R m⊂Σ  
Conditional on both observed and unobserved heterogeneity x  and u , I specify the 
reserve price distribution and the cost distribution as exponential as follows 
⎟⎟⎠
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where ),0( ∞∈c  and ),0( ∞∈r . By including the intercept in x , I normalize the 
unobserved heterogeneity term u  such that .0][ =uE  I assume that ),0( 2σNu ∼ , where 
2σ  is an unknown parameter. 
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2.2 Structural Equilibrium Solutions 
Next I need to solve the theoretical auction model for equilibrium solutions with the 
above specified distributions. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding strategy in the first 
round is given as follows, which is a closed-form solution 
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The Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding strategy in the second round, which is a 
solution to the equation given below 
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does not have a closed form. 
 
2.3 Estimation and Testing for Changes of Private Cost Distributions 
In my auction data, at round ,j  2,1=j , we observe reserve prices, number of 
potential bidders and a set of auction heterogeneities ),,( lll xNr . We also observe bids in 
round 1 and round 2, respectively. My estimation of the structural parameters is based on 
the likelihood function of r  given in (1) and the moment conditions of ljib  ( 2,1=j  ), 
where ljib  denotes the i -th bid in the l -th auction at the j -th round. Specifically, from (3) 
we obtain the moment condition  
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for the equilibrium bids lib1  in the first auction round. Similarly, from (4) we can obtain 
);,,,,(],),(,,|[ 22212 θσγllllllll uxbmuxgNscbE ii ≡⋅≤ ∗                        (6) 
for the equilibrium bids lib2  in the second round, where  );,,,,( 222 θσγlll uxbm i   does not 
have a closed form because the second round bidding function does not have a closed form. 
Note (1), (5) and (6) are all conditional on lu  which is not observed. For estimation, 
however, we need to obtain conditions that depend only on observables. In order to derive 
such conditions, we integrate lu  out of (1), (5) and (6) and get the followings 
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);,,,(]),(,,|[ 22212 θσγllllll xbMxgNscbE ii ≡⋅≤ ∗  
lllll duuwuxbm i )|();,,,,( 222 σθσγ ⋅= ∫∞∞− .                   (9) 
The parameters of primary interests are ,γ  ,1θ  2θ  and σ . I estimate them using 
(7), (8) and (9). 
 
2.3.1 A Two-Step Estimation Approach 
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I adopt a two-step estimation strategy. In the first step, I recover γ  and σ  using 
likelihood function (7) to get γˆ  and σˆ . In the second step, I estimate 1θ  and 2θ  using 
moment conditions (8) and (9) as well as the estimates γˆ  and σˆ . 
Since I fully specify the distribution of the reserve price and we observe reserve 
prices, in the first step, γ  and σ  can be efficiently estimated by maximum likelihood (ML) 
approach. A complication arises from the feature that there is no closed form likelihood 
function because of the integration with respect to lu . Thus, I use a simulated maximum 
likelihood (SML) estimation approach (Gourieroux and Monfort (1996)). Specifically, the 
SML estimator is defined by 
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llll
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σγσγ σγ .                     (10) 
As indicated in (10), I use the importance sampling technique in the numerical 
integration. The importance density function is the standard normal ).(⋅φ  I draw S  of sul s 
from )(⋅φ  in simulation, where S  is sufficiently large compared to the sample size .1L  As 
∞→1, LS  and 0/1 →SL , the SML estimator is asymptotically equivalent to the ML 
estimator (Gourieroux and Monfort (1996)). 
In the second step, I separately estimate 1θ  and 2θ , using moment conditions (8) 
and (9), respectively, and the estimates γˆ  and σˆ  obtained in the first step. Again because 
of the presence of the unobserved heterogeneity, I propose a method of simulated moments 
estimator (MSM). Let );ˆ,ˆ,,()( jjijjijji xbMbY θσγθ llll −= , ( )2,1=j . We need to 
simulate );ˆ,ˆ,,( jjij xbM θσγll , hence I draw sul  from )ˆ|( σ⋅w  and define 
);ˆ,ˆ,,,()( j
s
jijjij
s
ji uxbMby θσγθ lllll −= . 
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For each ( )2,1=j , a MSM estimator can be defined by 
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where Ω  is a KK ×  symmetric positive-definite weighting matrix. 
Additional difficulty in computation arises from the fact that the simulated 
);ˆ,ˆ,,( jjij xbM θσγll  involves the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy, which is especially 
cumbersome for 2=j , because it does not have a closed form solution. I follow Elyakime, 
Laffont, Loisel and Vuong (1994) to numerically recover the bidding function by a 
recursive procedure. Starting from the boundary condition, the equilibrium bidding 
strategy can be numerically solved in a recursive manner. Note that the resulting MSM 
estimator is consistent given that the first-step estimators γˆ  and σˆ  are consistent. 
Noting the complexity involved in my two-step estimation procedure, I use 
bootstrap to obtain variance-covariance matrices of the estimates. Because of the panel 
feature of the auction data, I adopt a block bootstrap (e.g. Andrews (2002)) to obtain the 
standard errors for my two-stage MSM estimator. 
 
2.3.2 Testing for Cross-Stage Change of Private Cost Distributions 
In the previous section, I develop a framework of estimating the structural model of 
multi-round auctions separately round by round, allowing for the underlying cost 
distributions to change across two rounds. It would be interesting to test whether the 
underlying cost distributions change or not across stages. If it turns out that the 
distributions do not change, it means that bidders re-draw their costs from the same 
distribution across stages. Moreover, in this case, I can more efficiently estimate the 
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private cost distribution parameters by jointly estimating both auction rounds. 
I propose a formal test following Andrews and Fair (1988), who extend the Chow 
test of structural changes in classical linear models (Chow (1960)) to test structural 
changes in nonlinear models. The null hypothesis here is 210 : θθ =H , which is the case 
of testing for pure structural change (see Andrews and Fair (1988)). The Wald test statistic 
is applicable to my MSM estimator, which can be implemented as follows. First, the MSM 
in (MSM) is implemented as discussed previously. Let LL /11 =π  and LL /22 =π . Then, 
the Wald test statistic is given by 
)ˆˆ()/ˆ2/ˆ/ˆ()ˆˆ( 2121122211
'
21 θθππππθθ −−+−= −VVVLW  
where 1ˆV  and 2Vˆ  are the estimated asymptotic variances matrices of 1ˆθ  and 2θˆ  
respectively, 12Vˆ  is the matrix of the estimated asymptotic covariances between 1ˆθ  and 2θˆ  
The general inverse −⋅)(  of covariance term in the middle equals the regular inverse 1)( −⋅  
with probability going to one as ∞→L .  W  follows a 2χ  distribution with the dimension 
of the structural parameter vector θ  as its degrees of freedom. 
 
3 Results 
In this section, I apply my structural econometric approach to analyze the data from 
the INDOT, so as to uncover the underlying private cost and reserve price distributions. By 
concentrating on a specific type of bridge work, I choose a set of observed covariates 
{=x dbe, time, np, steel, length, intercept} . First I use the two-stage estimation to estimate 
the model under unobserved auction heterogeneity. Then I test the cross-stage change of 
private cost distributions. Lastly, I conduct a robustness check. 
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3.1 SML and MSM Estimates for the Structural Parameters and the Unobserved 
Heterogeneity 
 
The parameters of the reserve price distribution γ  and the parameter of the 
unobserved heterogeneity σ  can be jointly estimated based on (SML). I draw a large 
sample, namely 1000=S , of sul s from )1,0(N , i,e, ),( luφ  and adopt importance 
sampling to implement the SML. Furthermore, I gain the standard errors through bootstrap. 
The results are reported in Table 3.1. 
Next we estimate parameters in private cost distributions jθ  ( for )2,1=j  based 
on (11). To gain the simulated moments, I recursively solve for equilibrium bids and 
calculate the numerical integration. I simulate lu  from )ˆ,0(
2σN . Here the number of sul s 
that I draw is 100=S , a number relatively smaller than the one I use in implementing 
SML, as an MSM estimator is consistent for any fixed number of simulations (Gourieroux 
and Monfort (1996)). Furthermore, I use the identity matrix as the weighting matrix. Using 
bootstrap, I obtain the standard errors of the estimates. Moreover, as we need to incorporate 
the variation from the estimation of γˆ  and σˆ , I jointly resample the auction data including 
both reserve prices and bids and repeat the SML estimation and MSM estimation 
simultaneously. The results of the estimation are reported in the first four columns of Table 
3.2. 
The results indicate that all variables that I pick up have significant effects on 
private costs. Evaluated at the sample mean of the observed and unobserved auction 
characteristics, the mean private cost is about $641,000. Increases in the length of the 
bridges and the time needed to accomplish the projects raise private costs, and in turn 
increase bids, as expected. Specifically, holding all the other factors constant, increasing 
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the length of the project by one meter (or 3.28 feet) will increase the mean private cost by 
0.21% or about $1,350. One more working day needed for a project will increase the mean 
private cost approximately by 0.42% or $2,700. Furthermore, rising in the DBE percentage 
results in higher private cost. This is reasonable because higher DBE percentage increases 
the primary contractor's transaction cost in a project by finding and subcontracting partial 
work to a DBE firm. More specifically, one unit increase in DBE will increase the mean 
private cost by about 4% or slightly more than $25,700. An interesting pattern shows 
different effects of the number of projects (np) on the government's reserve price and the 
bidders' costs. Increasing the number of projects involved in one contract tends to raise the 
government's valuation of the work, but to lower the bidders' costs. This is because a bidder, 
while undertaking the projects, will consider the economic scale of taking multi-projects 
on multi-sites in neighborhood that reduces his cost. The government may not take the 
effect of economic scale into account since it does not assume the work anyway. This 
explains why we see a negative effect of np on the private costs, but a positive effect on the 
reserve price. Moreover, one unit increase in the number of projects can save the firm's 
private cost on average by about 3.9% which is slightly less than $25,000. Bridges of a 
steel structure cause about $180,000 more than bridges of other structures on the mean 
private cost. Furthermore, the estimate of the unobserved heterogeneity parameter is 
strongly significant, meaning that there exists unobserved auction heterogeneity in my data 
set. 
 
3.2 Testing for Cross-Stage Change of Private Cost Distributions 
To implement the test, I estimate the bidding equations separately round by round 
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and obtain 1ˆθ  and 2θˆ . I then compute the W  statistic, which is 1.45. Thus the null 
hypothesis is not rejected at a 5% significance level. It implies that a bidder re-draws his 
private cost from the same cost distribution across different auction rounds. 
In this case, I re-estimate θ  in view of θθθ == 21  by utilizing this restriction in 
the MSM estimation to obtain a more efficient estimate. The results are reported in the last 
two columns of Table 9. In sections that follow I use these estimates for inference. 
 
3.3 Robustness Check 
I take the estimate of the parameter of the unobserved auction heterogeneity σˆ  
from the first-stage estimation for granted in the second-stage, assuming that the 
unobserved auction heterogeneities are from the same distribution for both the auctioneer 
and the bidders. Although this is mainly for simplifying computation (particularly for those 
of the second round auctions), I can empirically check its validity. I estimate the parameter 
of the unobserved heterogeneity in (11) jointly with the parameters of the private cost 
distribution and obtain σ~ . I then compare σˆ  and σ~ . It turns out that σˆ  and σ~  are very 
close (0.054 and 0.055), which validates the assumption. 
 
4 Counterfactual Analysis 
In this section we investigate welfare impacts of different reserve price release 
policies on the government. Motivated by the INDOT data feature, my model has focused 
on the use of the secret reserve price by the government. Alternatively, the government can 
make the engineer's estimate public and use it as a public reserve price. In this scenario, the 
government can find no bids submitted if all bidders' private costs are above the public 
 65
reserve price. If I maintain the random cost replacement assumption, then the government 
can re-auction the project in the next round with the same public reserve price. As a result, 
under the random cost replacement assumption, the multi-round feature can be 
accommodated by both secret and public reserve prices. It would be interesting to compare 
the welfare implications of these two mechanisms using a counterfactual analysis. Such a 
comparison allows us to evaluate the INDOT's auction mechanism and assess the 
efficiency of its current reserve price policy. Moreover, it offers insight on why secret 
reserve prices are used in auctions. Since I have uncovered the underlying structural 
elements, I can conduct simulations under the two different reserve price release policies 
and compare the government's payment under the two different scenarios. 
I construct a representative auction by setting all observed characteristics at the 
sample means of the corresponding covariates. The simulation results are reported in Table 
3.3. The expected procurement cost is $537,689 under the public reserve price, $524,048 
under the secret reserve price. The difference is strongly significant. The INDOT on 
average can save $13,641, or 2.5% of the project value, on a typical bridge work auction by 
adopting a secret reserve price, thereby saving millions of dollars of budgets on all 
highway projects yearly. On the other hand, the difference in the probability of no sale is 
10%. The INDOT undergoes a no sale risk of 10% greater by adopting a secret reserve 
price. However, it comes with a large standard error and therefore statistically insignificant. 
Moreover, in practice the highway contracts are often sold out within two rounds, the cost 
saved by adopting the secret reserve price outweighs the no sale risk caused. Hence my 
findings indicate that the use of secret reserve price may be a good policy in practice in 
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procurement auctions.1 
 
5 Conclusion 
I develop a structural approach to analyze the INDOT data. The structural approach 
recovered the distributions of the reserve prices and the private cost. The estimates for 
structural parameters allow us to conduct counterfactual analyses. I find that the INDOT 
could have significantly saved budgets by adopting a secret reserve price rather than using 
a public reserve price. 
The empirical analysis of this chapter offers insights into the use of secret reserve 
prices in multi-round auctions and the strategic changes in bidders' bidding strategies. It is 
worth noting, on the other hand, that this structural analysis is based on the static model 
with non-forward looking bidders. The advantage of the static model is that it 
accommodates the flexibility of allowing for changes of bidders' private cost distributions 
across stages. However, the conclusions from the structural analysis and the counterfactual 
analysis do not necessarily hold if the bidders are forward looking. This stimulates my 
research in a new chapter. One can introduce dynamic features into the model by assuming 
that bidders are forward looking and their private cost distributions do not change across 
stages. In the next chapter, I propose a dynamic model of multi-round auctions with secret 
reserve prices and develop a structural approach. 
                                                 
1McAfee and McMillan (1992) have argued that secret reserve prices can be used for preventing collusions. 
 67
APPENDIX 
1. Derivation of the equilibrium bids 
For the exponential distribution, we have 
)),exp(/exp(1)( uxccF +−−= θ   )),exp(/exp(1)( uxrrG +−−= γ  
)),exp(/exp()(1 uxccF +−=− θ   )).exp(/exp()(1 uxrrG +−=− γ  
Substituting them into equation (1) in Chapter 3, I get 
.
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I use contraction mapping to solve it. We start with a conjecture of )(1 cβ , say )(01 cβ , 
which is the left hand side function. Then we substitute it into the right hand side to 
compute. This yields the right hand side function )(11 cβ . If my conjecture is right, then 
).()( 11
0
1 cc ββ =  Otherwise replace my conjecture with )(11 cβ  and start iteration until the 
left hand side function equals the right hand side function, say ).()( 111 cc
ii += ββ  Start with 
,)(01 cc =β  calculate right hand side function as 
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Then with )(11 cβ , we compute )(21 cβ . It follows that ),()( 1121 cc ββ =  
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)exp(/1)exp(/)1(
1)(21 uxuxN
cc +++−+= γθβ . 
Therefore the solution is given by )(21 cβ , i.e. 
)exp(/1)exp(/)1(
1)(1 uxuxN
cc +++−+= γθβ . 
 
2. Nonparametric Identification 
 
2.1. The First Stage of Multi-Round Procurement Auction 
In real auctions, on one hand reserve prices are observed and can be used to identify the 
distribution of the reserve price )(⋅G . On the other hand, costs are bidders' privation 
information which is not observed to econometricians. Instead, the econometricians can 
observe bids. At issue is with the observation of bids and reserve prices, whether we can 
identify the distribution of the latent private costs. Because the equilibrium bidding 
strategy relates the observed bids 1b  to the unobserved private costs 1c  which are random, 
bids are also random. Denote the distribution of bids in the first stage by )(1 ⋅H  with 
support ],[ 11 bb  which is twice continuously differentiable and has a density )(1 ⋅h  that is 
strictly positive on the support. Therefore the identification problem of the multi-round 
auction model with a secret reserve price reduces to whether the bidders' private cost 
distribution in every auction round is uniquely determined from the observed bids. 
Depending on the equilibrium relationship between 1b  and 1c , we can show that 
))(()( 1111 bFbH
−= β  and ))((/))(()( 11111 bbfbh −− ′= βββ  for all )](,[ 1 ccb β∈ . Further, with 
some algebra the first order condition of the bidders' problem in the first stage gives us the 
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following inverse bidding function for all ],[ ccc∈  
)()()1(
1),,,(
1111
1111 bbN
bNGHbc µλψ +−−== ,                       (A.1) 
where ))(1/()()( 111111 bHbhb −=λ , ))(1/()()( 111 jbGbgb −=µ  are hazard rates. Equation 
(A.1) expresses the private cost 1c  as a function of the equilibrium bid 1b , its distribution 
)(1 ⋅H , its density )(1 ⋅h , the government's reserve price distribution )(⋅G  with its 
corresponding density )(⋅g , and the number of potential bidders N . Specifically, equation 
(A.1) states that if the observed bids 1b  is the equilibrium bid, as is assumed in the 
structural econometric approach, then the bidders' private costs 1c  corresponding to 1b  
must satisfy such a relation. Let )(1 ⋅NH  denote the joint distribution of ),...,( 111 Nbb . 
Proposition 1 For ,...,2=N  let )(1 ⋅NH  and )(⋅G  be two distributions with respective 
support NNbb ],[ 11  and ],[ cc  with ),,,( 111 NGHbc ψ=  and ),,,( 11 NGHcc ψ= . There 
exist a pair of distribution ],[ 1 GF  of bidders and the government's reserve price with 
common support ],[ cc  such that )(1 ⋅NH  and )(⋅G  are the corresponding distributions of 
the equilibrium bids and reserve prices in the j-th stage of the multi-round procurement 
auction with independent private costs and a secret reserve price if and only if for 
,...,2=N   
A1.  )(),...,( 1111111 iN
N
iNN bHbbH =Π=   
A2. the function ),,,( 11 NGH⋅ψ  defined in equation (A.1) is strictly increasing on ],,[ 11 bb   
and its inverse is differentiable on )],,,(),,,,([],[ 1111 NGHbNGHbcc ψψ≡ . 
 In addition, when )(⋅jF  and )(⋅G  exist, they are unique with support ],[ cc  and satisfy 
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)),,,(()( 1111 NGHcHcF
−= ψ  for all ],[ ccc∈ . Meanwhile, ),,,(1 NGH⋅ψ  is the quasi 
inverse of the equilibrium bidding strategy in the sense that ),,,(),,,( 111 NGFbNGHb
−= βψ  
for all )](,[ 1 ccb β∈ . Proposition 1 indicates that the multi-round procurement auction 
model with a secret reserve price is nonparametrically identified. The identification is 
achieved without any parametric assumptions. 
 
2.2. The Reauction Stage of Multi-Round Procurement Auction 
In a reauction stage, the information released from the previous stage raises a new 
difficulty because the lowest bid from the previous stage serves as a binding announced 
reserve price. For illustration, we solve the identification problem in stage j . Different 
from stage  1 , the binding pseudo reserve price ∗−1js  introduces a truncation because a 
potential bidder with a private cost higher than ∗−1js  does not bid. Let 
∗
jib  denote the 
equilibrium bid of the i -th actual bidder, ∗= jNi ,...1 , and )(⋅∗jH  be its distribution. Thus 
)(/)()|)(Pr()( 11
∗
−
∗
−
∗∗∗ =≤≤= jjjjjj sFcFscbcbH β  where )(1 ∗−= bc jβ . Differentiating 
with respect to ∗b  gives the conditional density )(/)](/)([)( 1 csFcfbh jjjj β ′= ∗−∗∗  for all 
)](,[ 1
∗
−∈ jj scb β . Hence with some algebra the first order condition of the bidders' problem 
in stage j  gives us the following inverse bidding function for all ],[ 1
∗
−∈ jscc  
∗
−
∗
−
∗∗ ≤= 11  if ))(,,,,( jjjjjjjj scsFNGHbc ψ  
)|()()1(
1
1
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∗∗
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where ))()(1/()()()( 11
∗
−
∗∗∗
−
∗∗∗∗ ⋅−⋅= jjjjjjjjjj sFbHsFbhbλ and 
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))()(/()()|( 11 jjjjjj bGsGbgsb −= ∗−∗−µ  are quasi hazard rates. Equation (A.2) is the analog 
of (A.1), but involves )( 1
∗
−jj sF , which is unknown. This complicates the identification of 
the model. The next result solves the identification problem. 
Proposition 2 For ,...,2=N  let )(⋅∗jH  and )(⋅G  be two distributions with respective 
support ],[ 1
∗
−jj sb  and ],,[ cc  and )(⋅π  be a discrete distribution. There exist a pair of 
distribution ],[ GFj  of bidders and the government's reserve price with common support 
],[ cc  such that (1) )(⋅∗jH   is the truncated distribution of the equilibrium bids and )(⋅G  is 
the reserve price distribution in the j-th stage of the multi-round procurement auction with 
independent private costs, a secret reserve price and a binding information bound 
],[1 ccs j ∈∗− , and (2) )(⋅π  is the distribution of the number of actual bidders ∗jN  if and only 
if for ,...,2=N  
A1.  )(⋅π   is Binomial with parameters  ))(1,( 1∗−− jj sFN  , where  1)(0 1 << ∗−jj sF   
A2. The observed bids are  ... dii   as  )(⋅∗jH   conditionally upon  ∗jN   and  +∞=∗↑ ∗− )(lim 1 bhjsb j   
A3. the function  ))(,,,,( 1
∗
−
∗⋅ jjj sFNGHψ   defined in equation (A.2) is strictly increasing on  
],,[ 1
∗
−jj sb   and its inverse is differentiable on 
))](,,,,()),(,,,,([],[ 1111
∗
−
∗∗
−
∗
−
∗∗
− ≡ jjjjjjjjjjj sFNGHssFNGHbsc ψψ . 
Moreover, if conditions A1-A3 hold, then )( 1
∗
−jj sF  is unique while )(⋅jF  is uniquely 
defined on ],[ 1
∗
−jsc  as )))(,,,,(()()( 1
1
1
∗
−
∗−∗∗
− ⋅⋅=⋅ jjjjjjjj sFNGHHsFF ψ . In addition, 
))(,,,,( 1
∗
−
∗⋅ jjjj sFNGHψ  is the quasi inverse of the equilibrium bidding strategy in the 
sense that ),,,())(,,,,( 11 NGFbsFNGHb jjjjj
−∗
−
∗ = βψ  for all )](,[ 1∗−∈ jj scb β . Proposition 
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2 parallels Proposition 1. In particular, it indicates that the multi-round procurement 
auction model with a secret reserve price is nonparametrically identified on )](,[ 1
∗
−jj sc β . 
Because of the truncation of the observed bids, a nonparametric approach prevents us from 
identifying the entire distribution of private costs. 
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Table 3.1 SML Estimates of Reserve Prices Distribution and Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Variable                     Coef.                        Std. Err. 
dbe 0.0514* 0.0018 
time 0.0052* 0.0002 
np 0.299* 0.0082 
steel 0.300* 0.0106 
length 0.00212* 0.0001 
_cons 11.469* 0.0923 
 2σ   0.054* 0.0016 
*: significant at 5%   
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Table 3.2 MSM Estimates of Private Distribution 
Variable Separate Estimates More Efficient Estimates 
  1θ   Std. Err  2θ   Std. Err  θ   Std. Err 
dbe* 0.0398 0.0010 0.0393 0.0037 0.0401 0.0009 
time* 0.0044 0.0001 0.0041 0.0005 0.0042 0.0001 
np* -0.0343 0.0008 -0.0394 0.0077 -0.0388 0.0009 
steel* 0.2947 0.0098 0.2440 0.0529 0.2809 0.0071 
length* 0.0021 0.0001 0.0019 0.0002 0.0021 0.0001 
_cons* 12.1394 0.0336 16.8904 2.2696 12.2670 0.0654 
 2σ  (robustness check): 0.0548 
*: significant at 5% 
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Table 3.3 The Comparison of Policies by Simulations 
difference in  difference in  
government's payment Std. Err probability of no sale Std. Err 
 )sec( retpublic −     )sec( retpublic −    
13641* 5876  - 0.1 0.06 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF MULTI-ROUND AUCTION MODEL WITH 
FORWARD LOOKING BIDDERS 
 
1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I continue to study the interesting multi-round feature observed in 
the procurement auctions organized by the Indiana Department of Transportation. This 
feature is attributable to the use of secret reserve prices in these auctions. The previous 
chapters have obtained various predictions and implications from the theoretical model and 
results from the structural empirical analyses on the INDOT data. However, these results 
are all based on a critical assumption: bidders are non-forward looking. As I proposed at 
the end of the last chapter, what if bidders are forward looking? In this chapter, I construct 
a dynamic bidding model in multi-round procurement auctions with secret reserve prices to 
analyze the dynamic bidding behavior when the bidders foresee the possibility of a 
reauction round in the future. 
In a dynamic setting, a bidder's control problem is to optimally choose bid in an 
infinite period horizon, because he considers the possibility of the future reauctioning. The 
state variables in the dynamic auction game include a bidder's belief about the secret 
reserve price and his private cost. In the first auction round, the belief of the secret reserve 
price is the upper bound of the reserve price distribution because there is no information 
about the reserve price. In a reauction round, it is represented by the lowest bid from the 
previous auction round if the auction round fails. The state of the belief of the reserve price 
is common knowledge to all bidders and also observed to the econometrician. Private costs, 
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on the other hand, are bidders' private information and unobserved to the econometrician. 
The conditional independence assumption, as will be discussed subsequently, allows us to 
derive a Markov Perfect equilibrium (MPE) in the presence of an unobserved state. 
When bidders' private cost distribution does not change and cost redraws are 
independent across period, the dynamic model in this paper readily accommodates my 
previous static multi-round auction model. The previous model is a special case in which 
bidders are not forward looking. Without being forward looking, bidders place bids in 
every round after they obtain their draws of new private costs. I prove that when the 
discount factor in my dynamic auction model is zero, I am back to the case without forward 
looking. My model yields some interesting predictions and implications. First, bidding 
prices uniformly decline over stages, because of the information about the secret reserve 
prices revealed in the previous stage. Numerical results show that the value function 
increases in the state variable, namely the belief about the reserve price. Second, my 
bidding model predicts that in the presence of a future bidding possibility, bidders bid less 
aggressively and therefore they increase their current bids. 
There has been little empirical work on dynamic auction games. Existing studies on 
empirical estimation of auctions has largely restricted to a static auction setting. See 
Paarsch (1992), Laffont, Ossard and Vuong (1995), and Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) 
among others. An exception is Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) who first study the 
estimation approach of a dynamic auction game with capacity constraint as the state 
variable to analyze California highway auctions. In this chapter, my dissertation offers the 
second study of structural dynamic auction models. 
To analyze the procurement auction data, and in addition to provide an empirical 
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framework within which the dynamic multi-round model with secret reserve prices can be 
analyzed, I develop a structural model from the theoretical model that I propose. My 
structural approach takes into account of the unobserved auction heterogeneity as I did in 
the model with non-forward looking bidders. 
I adopt a two step estimation method. As the two-step estimation approach in the 
literature, my approach is computationally easy to implement. Two step estimation 
methods based on first order condition are well known in the literature. Although many 
studies apply the two step method, most of them are on static auction games.1 Estimation of 
dynamic auction games remains limited with an exception of Jofre-Bonet and 
Pensendorfer (2003). I distinguish my research from Jofre-Bonet and Pensendorfer in the 
following ways. First, I analyze an auction game with multiple rounds and single auction 
object instead of a repeated auction game with different auction objects in different periods. 
Second, I explicitly estimate the reserve price distribution from the data. Third, I control 
for the unobserved heterogeneity when I estimate the distribution of bids. 
I use my structural approach to analyze the INDOT data. Using the structural 
estimates, I carry out a counterfactual analysis by simulating the auctions with different 
government's reserve price release policies in the multi-round scenario. I find that whether 
using a secret reserve price or using a public reserve price depends on the bidder’s attitude 
about the future. When the bidders are forward looking and their discount factor is 
sufficiently large, announcing the reserve price can be better than keeping it secret. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, I construct the model of dynamic 
multi-round procurement auctions with secret reserve prices, and solve the Markov Perfect 
                                                 
1See Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel and Vuong (1994), Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) and Athey, Levin and 
Seira (2004) for applications in various auction studies. 
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equilibrium. I also investigate the implications from my model. In Section 3, I provide a 
two step estimation method for analyzing dynamic multi-round auction data. In Section 4, I 
apply the structural framework to analyze the INDOT data. In Section 5, I use 
counterfactual analysis to evaluate the government's reserve price policy. Section 6 
concludes. All technical proofs are included in the Appendix. 
 
2 The Model for Dynamic Multi-Round Auctions 
In this section, I propose a game-theoretic model for dynamic multi-round 
procurement auctions with secret reserve prices, and derive the symmetric MPE. 
 
2.1 The Stage Game 
In the first stage, the government offers a single indivisible contract for sale. The 
events occur in the following order. First, the characteristics of the projects contained in the 
contract are revealed to bidders. An exogenous engineer estimate 0r  is kept secret and 
fixed throughout the auction rounds. The value of 0r  is drawn by the government from a 
distribution )(⋅G . Second, N  potential bidders draw their costs of conducting the 
contractual highway work privately and independently from a common distribution )(⋅F . 
Third, bidders may submit bids. Lastly, the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder if the 
bid is at the same time lower than the reserve price. Bids are released regardless of whether 
the contract is awarded or not, while the reserve price is disclosed only if the contract is 
awarded. 
If the contract is unsold, the auction proceeds to a reauction stage. In a reauction 
stage t , the government reauctions the same contract from the previous round. The reserve 
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price is kept secret and the same as before. Each bidder readjusts his private information 
and obtains a new random draw of tc . Observing information from the previous round, 
bidders update their beliefs about the reserve price. Specifically, the lowest bid from the 
previous round denoted by ts  serves as a truncated upper bound of the reserve price. The 
upper bound of the reserve price ts  is a random variable to the bidders and changes over 
periods. It is used by bidders when forming new bids. Therefore it is a common state 
variable in the dynamic game. Only bidders with costs lower than the bound choose to 
submit bids. The game continues until the contract is awarded. 
Note that from an econometric point of view, ts  is a state variable observed to both 
bidders and the econometrician. However, each individual bidder’s cost realization tc  is 
not observed by the other bidders and the econometrician. Therefore I distinguish the 
observed and the unobserved state respectively. For further discussion, see Rust (1987). In 
Section 2.3, I give assumptions on the statistical properties of the state variables. 
 
2.2 The Dynamic Structure 
The common priors include the distribution of c ,  )(⋅F  and the distribution of 0r , 
)(⋅G  on the support ],[ cc . I use lower case to denote the corresponding density functions. 
The transition of states is a Markov process. Denote transition probability density function 
as )|( 1 tt ssq +  and transition function as )( tsω  such that )|()( 1 ttt ssEs +=ω . I will give the 
specific functional form of the transition function while I discuss the distribution of 
optimal bids. As a result, all bidders are identical a priori and the game is symmetric. 
In order for me to adopt the framework of Markov dynamic decision processes, 
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conditional independence of the observed state and the latent cost is crucial in the data 
generating process. The role of conditional independence assumption is discussed in 
details in Rust (1987). I explain it in our context in the next section. I seek to find a 
symmetric MPE for an infinite period dynamic control problem. Conditional on the current 
state, the value function )(⋅V  and the policy function )(⋅β  are independent of time index. 
 
2.3 The Value Function 
In period t , bidder i  chooses b  to maximize his discounted expected payoff. The 
discount factor is denoted by δ  ( 10 << δ ). The value function is defined by the following 
equation 
]),|,(),,(
),,|Pr(),,|Pr()[(
max),,(
1111111 ++++++−+
−−
− ∫⋅
+−=
tttttttitti
tittitt
btitti dsdcscscpsbcW
sbbnonesbbicb
sbcW
δ
.          (1) 
Since we cannot observe c , in the subsequent analysis I use the ex ante value 
function which integrates out cost. In order for this to work, I make the conditional 
independence assumption, following the discussion in Rust (1987). 
 CI )|()|(),|,( 1111 tttttttt ccfssqscscp ++++ ⋅=   
CI implies that given the previous state, the current observed state and private cost 
are independent. Note however, CI in our context is different from Rust (1987).2 In 
addition, we make the following assumption. 
 A1 tt cc ⊥+1   
A1 means while they are forward looking, future cost is random and not dependent 
                                                 
2Rust makes CI as )|()|(),|,( 11111 +++++ ⋅= tttttttt scfssqscscp , which implies that tc  is noise 
superimposed on the ts  process. This does not fit our case. 
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upon their current random draws.3 Bidders replace their costs in every round because of 
reasons such as opportunity cost and capacity constraint. A1 and CI imply the following 
conditional independence assumption adaptable to our context. 
 CI’ )()|(),|,( 1111 ++++ ⋅= ttttttt cfssqscscp   
Furthermore, we define the following ex ante value function 
tttittititi dccfsbcWsbV )(),,(),( −− ∫= .                                           (2) 
From here on, as I seek to find a symmetric bidding strategy, I suppress subscript  i  
and the dependence of the value function on the bidding strategies of the other bidders in 
the value function. With assumption CI', combining (1) and (2) leads to the following 
recursive equation 
tttt
tttbt
dccfssVE
sbnonesbicbsV
)()]|)((
),|(Pr),|(Pr)[(max)(
1 ××
+−=
+
∫ δ .                       (3) 
In equation (3), s  represents the belief about the reserve price. When s  is larger, 
bidders are more optimistic about the reserve price. Furthermore, because of the symmetry 
of the bidding strategies and the value functions across bidders, the value functions of all 
bidders are uniformly higher. Hence intuitively, the value function is increasing in s . We 
will obtain the value function numerically to verify our intuition. 
 
2.4 The Bid Distribution 
Because the equilibrium bidding strategy relates the observed bids b  to the 
unobserved private costs c  which are random, bids are also random. Throughout my 
                                                 
3Statistical tests we perform in the data offer support for the random replacement assumption. The correlation 
of the ranks of the bidders in the first round and in the second round is about 0.30. Further test of the 
correlation of same bidders' bids across auction rounds shows that the correlation is 0.17. 
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analysis, I denote the distribution of bids b , )(⋅H  which has a support ],[ bb . 
Furthermore, I can express the probability terms using the distributions of bids and reserve 
prices. Bidder i 's probability of winning the auction is defined as follows 
.
)(
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)| and )(min(Pr),,|(Pr
1
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titi
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Denote i−  as the other bidders and )1()min( −− = Ni bb  as the smallest order statistic 
in the other 1−N  bids. Denote its distribution function as ( )⋅M  with corresponding 
density function )(⋅m . The expression of the distribution of the order statistic 
)1()min( −− = Ni bb  is 1)](1[1)( −−−= NuHuM , with density )()](1)[1()( 2 uhuHNum N−−−= . 
The following lemma gives the probability of the event that no bidder wins the contract in 
period t  conditional on the state ts  and greatly simplifies the computation burden in my 
subsequent estimation method. 
Lemma 1 The probability of the event that no bidder wins the contract given the state  s  in 
period  t   can be represented by 
dv
sG
vgvMsbbisbbnone
t
s
ctiti
t
)(
)()(),,|(Pr1),,|(Pr ∫−−= −− . 
Now I give the functional form of the transition probability density function and the 
motion function respectively. The transition probability function is given by the following 
equation 
]))(1(1/[)()](1[)|( 1
1
11
N
tt
N
ttt sHshsHNssq −−⋅−⋅= +−++ . 
The motion function is given by the following equation 
1111 )|()|()( ++++ ⋅== ∫ ttttttt dsssqsssEsω . 
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2.5 Markov Perfect Equilibrium 
Next, I derive the MPE bidding strategies using the distribution function of bids. 
For easy exposition, I use s  to denote the current period state and s′  to denote the next 
period state. The first order condition is given by the following expression 
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Multiplying the equation by { })]()([)](1[/)( 1 bGsGbHsG N −− − , defining hazard 
rates for bid and reserve price )](1/[)()( bHbhb −=λ  and )]()(/[)()|( rGsGrgsr −=µ  
respectively, I get the following 
}.
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Some algebra yields 
)|)((
)|()()1(
1 ssVE
sbbN
cb ′++−+= δµλ .                                      (4) 
Note the bidder's markup includes two terms. The second term on the right hand 
side is the markup in the current period, the third term is the discounted markup in the 
future. 
Proposition 1 Under the monotone hazard rate assumption, equilibrium bids in the 
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dynamic model are increasing in the discount factorδ . 
Equation (4) has the following implications. First, as stated in the above 
proposition, equilibrium bids are increasing in δ . The larger the discount factor is, the 
more patient the agents are about the future, therefore the higher markup the bidders will 
add to their costs while placing bids. Second, the larger the state s  is, the higher the bound 
of the truncation, in other words the less restrictive (or competitive) the secret reserve price 
to the bidders. Therefore intuitively, bidders increase bids when  s   is high. With unknown 
function )(⋅V , it is not easy to show it analytically. However, I will show it by the 
numerical result through my empirical analyses. 
Proposition 2 If 0=δ  and the private cost distribution does not change, the following two 
results hold. 
(i) bidders' dynamic control problem is equivalent to non-forward looking problem. One 
can solve the game stage by stage to get the separate equilibrium. 
(ii) In the non-forward looking case, the equilibrium bid in stage t has the following 
expression 
)|()()1(
1
sbbN
cb µλ +−+= .                                                  (5) 
The implication of the above proposition is two-fold. First, it shows that the 
dynamic model with forward-looking accommodates the static model without forward 
looking, when private cost distributions do not change across stages. No forward looking 
means that bidders do not care about the same auction in the future. Second, with forward 
looking, bidders add more to the costs when they bid in the current period. The second 
result is stated in the corollary below. The additional part as seen in equation (4) explains 
the future possibility of winning this auction. 
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Corollary 1 When the private cost distributions are the same and the monotone hazard 
rate assumption holds, bidders bid more when they are forward looking than when they are 
not forward looking. 
The intuition is when a bidder is forward looking, he claims that his type is higher 
than his actual type by adding a future expectation to it. In other words, he bids less 
aggressively. In the context of procurement auctions, he bids more. 
Proposition 3 In the multi-round dynamic auction game, at equilibrium at the same state 
level on the whole common state space, the bid function in one period is less than or equal 
to the bid function in the previous period, ..ei , )()( 1 cc tt −≤ ββ  for all  c   on the common 
support. 
This result is consistent with the result derived from the non-forward looking case. 
It is also consistent with the two-round auction data and supported by the reduced-form 
regression analysis (see Chapter 2). 
 
3 Estimation Method 
This section gives a discussion of my estimation method of the dynamic 
multi-round auction model. First, I describe the two-step estimation approach based on the 
distribution of equilibrium bids and the first order condition of optimally chosen bids. Then 
I describe the identification of the distribution function of privately known costs briefly. 
 
3.1 Estimation Approach 
I observe data on bids, contract characteristics, number of potential bidders and 
bidders' state variable. My objective is to infer private costs. I propose a two step 
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estimation method which is computationally easy in that it does not require solving the 
equilibrium bid functions. In the first step, I estimate the distribution of equilibrium bids. 
In the second step, based on the equilibrium first order condition, I obtain the private costs 
and its distribution. This method, as the other two-step methods seen in auction literature, 
assumes that the observed bids are generated by equilibrium play and satisfy the first order 
condition of equilibrium bids. 
Two step estimation methods based on the first order condition are well known in 
the literature. See Elyakime, Laffont, Loisel and Vuong (1994), Guerre, Perrigne and 
Vuong (2000) and Athey, Levin and Seira (2004) for applications in various auction 
studies. Although many studies apply the two step method, most of them are on static 
auction games. Estimation of dynamic auction games remains limited with an exception of 
Jofre-Bonet and Pensendorfer (2003). 
From the first order condition, I have derived equation (4) for the optimal bids. This 
leads to the following equation for the private cost 
)|)((
)|()()1(
1)|( ssVE
sbbN
bsb ′−+−−= δµλϕ .                            (6) 
Equation (6) provides an explicit expression of the private costs that involves bid, 
the hazard function of bid, the hazard function of reserve price and the value function. 
Parallel to the former analysis of the markup of equilibrium bids, equation (6) states that 
the cost equals the bid minus a mark down. The mark down has two parts. The first part 
accounts for the level of competition in the current auction round. The second part accounts 
for the future discounted profit if firm i  wins the contract. Equation (6) can be used to 
recover the distribution of private costs. 
In order to infer the distribution of costs, I need estimators for the functions 
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appearing in the right hand side of (6). These functions are: the bid hazard function, the 
secret reserve price hazard function, the discount factor, the transition function and the 
value function. I discuss my strategy to find the appropriate estimators for them as follows. 
First, an estimator of the bid distribution function can be directly obtained from the data on 
bids and observed state variable and other heterogeneity. Therefore the bid hazard function 
can be obtained. Second, the secret reserve price hazard function can also be obtained 
directly from the data on reserve prices. Third, I choose different discount factors and 
examine how sensitive the estimates are to variations in the discount factor. Fourth, the 
transition function of the state is the distribution function of the random smallest order 
statistic from the truncated bid distribution on ],[ sb . In other words, )(sω  is drawn from a 
probability distribution function defined by ])](1[1/[])](1[1[ NN sHH −−⋅−− . Hence the 
transition of state is estimated along with the distribution function of bids. Finally, I need to 
recover the value function. The value function is defined in equation (3). However, 
equation (3) involves latent cost variables and endogenous decisions of other bidders. I 
give my method of how to recover the value function later. 
 
3.2 Reserve Price and Bid Distributions 
Based on the theoretical auction model, I parameterize two distributions: the 
reserve price distribution )(⋅G  and the bid distribution )(⋅H . In an econometric framework, 
asymptotic statistical inference is based on a large number of auctions. Let L  be the 
number of auctions. For the l -th auction, let )(⋅lG  and )(⋅lH  denote each primitive 
distribution respectively with corresponding densities )(⋅lg  and )(⋅lh , 2,1=j . Assume 
that ),,|( γlll uxGG ⋅=  and ),,|( θlll uxFH ⋅= , where lx  is a vector of variables that I 
 90
use to control for the observed auction heterogeneity, and lu  is a scalar variable that 
represents the unobserved auction heterogeneity, both affecting the government's reserve 
price as well as the bidders' bids, γ  is a vector of unknown parameters in KR⊂Γ , and θ  
is a vector of unknown parameters in .R K⊂Θ  I assume that u  is independent of x , and 
has a distribution )|( σ⋅W  with )|( σ⋅w  being the density function, where σ  is a vector of 
unknown parameters in .Rm⊂Σ  
Conditional on both observed and unobserved heterogeneity  x   and  u  , I specify 
the reserve price distribution and the bid distribution as exponential as follows 
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where ),0( ∞∈b  and ),0( ∞∈r . By including the intercept in x , I normalize the 
unobserved heterogeneity term u  such that .0][ =uE  I assume that ),0( 2σNu ∼ , where 
2σ  is an unknown parameter. 
 
3.3 The value function 
Note the estimation of the bid hazard function and the transition function is based 
on the distribution of observed bids from the first step. The key idea is if I can express the 
value function in terms of the distribution of bids, then I can get an estimator of the value 
function. The following proposition states that the value function can be represented as a 
recursive equation involving the bid distribution function. 
Proposition 4 Given the distribution of the equilibrium bids, the value function can be 
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represented as follows 
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The representation of the value function in equation (9) contains two parts. The first 
part accounts for the bidder's current expected profits. The second part accounts for the 
bidder's sum of discounted expected future profits. The proof of the proposition is based on 
two observations. First, I may write the probability of winning as a function of the 
distribution of bids by other bidders, ignoring dependence of other bidders' bids on cost 
draws. Thus each bidder's dynamic game is reduced to a single agent dynamic decision 
problem where each bidder maximizes the discounted sum of future payoffs using the 
equilibrium bid distribution associated with other bidders. Still, this single agent dynamic 
decision problem does involve the latent cost. My second observation is that the first order 
condition of optimal bids gives an explicit expression of the bidder's costs in terms of his 
equilibrium bids and the equilibrium bids distribution. Substituting this expression into the 
value function yields an expression involving the distribution and the density of 
equilibrium bids only. 
Next I develop numerical methods to approximate the value function based on 
equation (9). Furthermore, my methods are computationally easy for two reasons. First, the 
symmetric Markovian strategies require that bidders with the same state follow the same 
bidding strategy and the observed state variable s  is a common random variable for all 
bidders. Therefore the ex ante value function )(sV  is common to all bidders in the same 
period. Second, the transition function )(sω  is continuous in s  and therefore the value 
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function is continuous in s  as well. 
Specifically, I numerically evaluate the expected current period payoff as follows 
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∫ . 
Complexity arises from the computation of the integration. I adopt Monte Carlo 
sampling method to evaluate the integration as I obtain an estimator of the distribution of 
bids )(bh . I draw a large number of jb  )...3,2,1( Js =  from )|( sbH  on the support ],[ sb .  
The integration is the expectation of the integrand approximated by the sample analogue 
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Using Lemma 1, I can show that the probability terms in equation (recursive value) 
sum to dvvgvM
sG
sHsH sc )()()(
)()( ∫− . Then I numerically evaluate the discounted sum of 
future payoffs similarly by the Monte Carlo sampling approach. The probability terms in 
the bracket in equation (9) are defined as )(sB . The following lemma establishes the 
numerical method of evaluating )(sB  which greatly simplifies the computation. 
Lemma 2 It can be shown that the probability term )(sB  can be calculated by the 
following equation 
( ) 1
1
)(1)()( −
=
−= ∑ NiI
i
uH
I
sHsB ,  
where iu   is drawn from )|( suG   on the support ],[ sc . 
Finally, I iteratively solve for )(sV  based on the recursive equation in proposition 3 
and the numerical method. To evaluate the value function at any value s , start with ss =0  
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and obtain )( 0sA  and )( 0sB . Then obtain =1s  )( 0sω  by the transition function. )( 0sV  
is given by )|)(()()()( 01000 ssVEsBsAsV δ+= . Take a step further, calculate )( 1sA , 
)( 1sB  and 2s , and then substitute )()()( 211 sVsBsA δ+  for )( 1sV . After the 1-st 
substitution, I get )|)(()()()()()()( 121021000 ssVEsBsBsAsBsAsV δδ ++= . Stop at the  
m -th iterative substitution when the last term that involves ms  dies out. Sum up all terms 
to get )( 0sV . 
 
3.4 The Distribution of Private Costs 
With the distribution function of bids at hand, we can infer bidders' private costs. 
To see how I infer the distribution of costs, notice the following. First, there is a 
relationship between the distribution function of costs and the distribution function of bids 
given by )|()|( sbHscF = . Second, the inverse of the bid function conditional on state 
variables, )|( sbc ϕ= , is given in equation (6). Thus, using these two relationships, I can 
specify my estimator of the cost distribution function as 
)|()|(
})|(|{
sdHscF
csbb
⋅= ∫ ≤ϕ .                                                  (10) 
Given that ϕ  is invertible, the estimator can be written as )|)|(()|( 1 sscHscF −= ϕ . 
Standard errors of estimates are calculated using the delta method. 
Before I end this section, I briefly discuss the identification issue. In a dynamic 
structural auction model, I try to identify two primitives: the private cost distribution 
function )(⋅F  and the discount factor  δ  . In my model, knowing the random bids can not 
jointly identify the distribution of costs and the discount factor, which is similar to other 
dynamic estimation approaches (see Rust (1994)). However, given δ , I can identify the 
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distribution of cost which is the same as Jofre-Bonet and Pensendorfer (2003). 
 
4 Results 
This section presents the estimation results. I first report the estimates of the bid 
distribution function under control of unobserved heterogeneity. The estimation method is 
simulated maximum likelihood approach. I then discuss the estimates of the value function. 
Lastly, I discuss the inferred costs. 
 
4.1 Estimates of the Reserve Price and Bid Distribution Functions 
The parameters of the reserve price distribution γ  and the parameter of the 
unobserved heterogeneity σ  can be jointly estimated based on (7). I draw a large sample, 
namely 1000=S , of sul s from )1,0(N , ..ei , ),( luφ  and adopt importance sampling to 
implement the SML. Furthermore, I gain the standard errors through bootstrap. The results 
are reported in Table 3.1 (see Chapter 3). 
Next I estimate parameters in bid distributions θ  based on (8). I simulate lu  from 
θˆ  Here the number of sul s that I draw is 1000=S . Using bootstrap, I obtain the standard 
errors of the estimates. The results of the estimation are reported in Table 4.1. 
The results indicate that all variables that I pick up have significant effects on bids. 
I evaluate the effects at the mean of the bid distribution which is $516,210. Increases in the 
length of the bridges and the time needed to accomplish the projects raise private costs, and 
in turn increase bids, as expected. Specifically, holding all the other factors constant, 
increasing the length of the project by one meter (or 3.28 feet) will increase the mean bid 
by 0.23% or about $1,187. One more working day needed for a project will increase the 
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mean bid approximately by 0.53% or $2,633. Furthermore, rising in the DBE percentage 
results in higher bid. This is reasonable because higher DBE percentage increases the 
primary contractor's transaction cost in a project by finding and subcontracting partial 
work to a DBE firm. More specifically, one unit increase in DBE will increase the mean 
bid by about 4% or slightly more than $20,600. The number of projects (np) has a positive 
effect on bids. One unit increase in the number of projects can increase the mean bid by 
28% which is slightly more than $144,000. Bridges of a steel structure cause about 
$139,000 more than bridges of other structures on the mean bid. Furthermore, the estimate 
of the unobserved heterogeneity parameter is strongly significant, meaning that there exists 
unobserved auction heterogeneity in my data set. 
 
4.2 Estimates of Value Function 
Empirically, the value function depends on the state variable and the auction 
heterogeneity. I can approximate the value function for each auction l . I depict the value 
function in figure 4.1 at the mean of the auction characteristics and 95.0=δ  for 
illustration. 
The empirical results reveal some features of the value function. First, from the 
graph the value function is increasing in the state s . This finding reinforces my former 
intuition. The higher the bidder's state, the larger the value function is. The state s  
represents the bidder's belief of the reserve price. A high belief of the reserve price leads to 
a high markup. Finally such an optimistic bidding results in a high value. Second, I try 
different values of the discount factor δ . The results of the value function do not differ 
much. To find the reason, I decompose the contribution to the value function into )(sA  and 
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)(sB . )(sA  is the current payoff. )(sB  is the probability of winning in the future. I find 
that the first part )(sA  accounts for a dominant part of contribution. )(sB  is a very small 
number on the other hand. In other words, in symmetric bidding bidder i  has a much 
stronger belief that he wins in the current round. Most of his bidding efforts are paid to the 
current round. Hence the discount factor does not affect the value function dramatically. 
 
4.3 Estimates of Costs 
To illustrate the estimates of the distribution, I fix the value of the auction 
characteristics at the sample means and 95.0=δ . I first depict the bid function. Then I 
discuss the markup and depict the distribution function of costs with 95% confidence 
interval. 
Figure 4.2 depicts the equilibrium bids versus costs. The bid function is estimated 
using equation (4). The bid function is plotted by fixing the auction characteristics at the 
sample mean and state variable at the upper bound of the reserve price and varying the cost. 
In addition to the bid function, the 45 degree line is reported. As is evident in the figure, the 
bid increases with the cost. 
The markup denotes the difference between the bid and the cost of a bidder. In the 
figure, the markup is the distance between the bid and the 45 degree line. Note that the bid 
line is almost parallel to the 45 degree line. This further strengthens that bidders weigh 
dominantly on the current proportion of the markup as I have shown in the analysis of the 
value function. In particular, the current proportion is constant in the exponential 
specification. To some extent, it reflects bidders' opinion of winning today versus winning 
later. 
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Figure 4.3 depicts the distribution function of costs. The distribution function is 
obtained by using equation (10). The distribution function is reported at the sample mean 
of the auction characteristics. I also compute the standard errors by delta method. The dash 
lines represent the 95% confidence interval. 
Note that in order to obtain the estimates of private costs, we have to fix the 
discount factor. Next I change the discount factor to gain different sets of inferred costs. 
Correspondingly, we can examine how the discount factor affects the inferred costs. I try 
different values of the discount factor and find that the larger the discount factor, the 
smaller the inferred costs. This is reasonable because increasing the discount factor results 
in greater markup thereby leading to smaller inferred costs. Figure 4.4 illustrates the 
distributions of costs with 3.0=δ  and 9.0=δ  respectively. The distribution function 
associated with 9.0=δ  stochastically dominates the distribution function associated with 
3.0=δ . 
 
5 Counterfactual Analysis 
In this section, I conduct counterfactual analysis. Secret reserve prices are used in 
the INDOT highway auctions. After I recover the cost distribution, I can estimate the 
procurement cost under the use of public reserve price by simulation. I find that with use of 
public reserve price, the INDOT slightly save some costs. 
Motivated by the INDOT data feature, my model has focused on the use of the 
secret reserve price by the government. Alternatively, the government can make the 
engineer's estimate public and use it as a public reserve price. In this scenario, the 
government can find no bids submitted if all bidders' private costs are above the public 
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reserve price. Thus the government can re-auction the project in the next round with the 
same public reserve price. As a result, under the random cost replacement assumption, the 
multi-round feature can be accommodated by both secret and public reserve prices. It 
would be interesting to compare the welfare implications of these two mechanisms using a 
counterfactual analysis. Such a comparison allows us to evaluate the INDOT's auction 
mechanism and assess the efficiency of its current reserve price policy. Since I have 
uncovered the underlying cost distribution, I can conduct simulations under the two 
different reserve price release policies and compare the government's payment under the 
two different scenarios. However, as the cost distribution depends on the discount factor, I 
vary the discount factor to conduct simulations. 
I construct a representative auction by setting all observed characteristics at the 
sample means of the corresponding covariates. The simulation of the secret reserve price 
can be done directly with use of the estimated bid distribution. Hence it does not involve 
the cost distribution, neither the discount factor. However, the simulation of the public 
reserve price involves the cost distribution. I vary the discount factor. For each value of the 
discount factor, I obtain the corresponding simulation result of the public reserve price. 
I report some of the results of my simulation in Table 4.2. My simulation produces 
several interesting findings. First, using a public reserve price, the expected procurement 
cost is decreasing in the discount factor.4 This is consistent with my previous finding that 
the inferred costs decrease in the discount factor. Because the cost distribution function 
with a larger discount factor dominates the distribution with a smaller discount factor, 
using the former leads to a lower winning bid in simulation than using the latter, keeping 
all the other factors constant. Second, it reveals the effects of the two reserve price policies 
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on the procurement cost, the implication of which is two-fold. First, the lower the discount 
factor, the greater the advantage by keeping the reserve price secret. Second, as the 
discount factor increases to a sufficient value, we see a completely opposite result: 
announcing the reserve price public is better than keeping it secret. The cutoff value of the 
discount factor is about 0.9 according to the simulation. 
On average, when 1.0=δ , the INDOT can save about $12,000 on a typical bridge 
work auction by adopting a secret reserve price. This number is comparable to the number 
13,641 in the third chapter in view of 0=δ . Hence our finding indicates that the use of 
secret reserve price may be a good policy in practice in procurement auctions when bidders 
are not forward looking or not so forward looking (the discount factor is low). However, as 
the bidders care more and more about the future, secret reserve price policy loses its 
advantage. The reason is simple. When they are forward looking, as we have seen earlier, 
the bidders increase the markups. Furthermore, the greater the value of the discount factor, 
the higher the markups. 
 
6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I study multi-round auctions with secret reserve prices in a dynamic 
framework. This chapter is an extension of my previous chapter on multi-round auctions 
with secret reserve price in a static framework. I prove that the static model is a special case 
of the dynamic model in which the discount factor is zero. My model yields some 
predictions that can be empirically tested, such as that the equilibrium bids decline 
uniformly over various stages. Also, in the dynamic auction model, because of forward 
looking bidders may increase their current bids. 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 It would be strictly monotone had there been no simulation error. 
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I develop a structural approach to analyze the INDOT data. The structural approach 
recovered the distributions of the reserve prices and the private cost. The estimates for 
structural parameters allow us to conduct counterfactual analyses. I find that whether using 
a secret reserve price or using a public reserve price depends on the bidder’s attitude about 
the future. In particular, the INDOT could have saved budgets by adopting a public reserve 
price rather than using a secret reserve price when the bidders are forward looking and have 
a sufficient large discount factor. This chapter offers insights into the use of reserve prices 
in multi-round auctions with forward looking bidders and the strategic changes in bidders' 
bidding strategies. 
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APPENDIX 
1. Proof of Lemma 1 
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Thus the result immediately follows. 
 
2. Proof of Proposition 1 
The monotone hazard rate is standard in auction literature, it requires that ))(1/()( ⋅−⋅ Ff  is 
an increasing function. This is the same for )(⋅G . This is equivalent to 2]1[ gGg −≥−′ . 
With a few steps of algebra, it can be shown that 2])([ gGsGg −≥−′ . This implies that 
)|( s⋅µ  is increasing too. The implicit function in equation (4) is an increasing function. 
Therefore we conclude that it is an increasing function in c  and δ . 
 
3. Proof of Proposition 2 
When  0=δ  , the dynamic control problem is reduced to the following 
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[ ]),,|(Pr)(max),,( 11 −−−− −= titbtit sbbicbsbcW , 
which implies that the optimal bidding strategy can be solved stage by stage. 
The problem in stage t is 
)(
)()()](1)[( max 1
bG
bGsGbScb N −−− − . 
Defining hazard rates as for bid and reserve price )](1/[)()( bHbhb −=λ  and 
)]()(/[)()|( rGsGrgsr −=µ  respectively, the first order condition implies the 
representation in the proposition. 
 
4. Proof of Corollary 1 
Note in non-forward looking case, I can generally distinguish the distributions of bids and 
therefore the bidding functions from stage to stage. 
If the private cost distributions are the same, we get the same functional forms for the 
equilibrium bids. With the monotone hazard rate assumption, bid is an increasing function 
in c  and  )|)(( ssVE ′δ  . Because cssVEc >′+ )|)((δ , the bid with forward looking is 
larger than the bid without forward looking. 
 
4. Proof of Proposition 3 
We derive the First order condition using the cost distribution. Define ).(cb β=  Then we 
have 
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The distribution of smallest order statistic )1( −Nb  is corresponding to the smallest order 
statistic )1( −Nc . Therefore, I have 
)(
)()](1)[1())(())]((1)[1())(( 22
c
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−− .         (A.1) 
Substituting this into (A.1)  result in the following 
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Multiplying by )()( csG β ′  and rearranging, we get the following 
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Note that )(cb β= . We can rewrite the above equation as 
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Integrating over ],[ sc  and using the boundary condition ss =)(β , we obtain 
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In order to compare tb  and 1−tb , I add subscript to s  to distinguish bidding strategies in 
different periods. At the symmetric MPE, tb  is the optimal choice in period .t  Therefore I 
have the following inequality 
}.)()]()([)()](1[
))()(()](1)[{(
)(
1
})()]()([)()](1[
))()(()](1)[{(
)(
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−⋅
+−−−≥
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−⋅
+−−−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
∫
∫
dvvgvMbMsGcF
VbGsGcFcb
sG
dvvgvMbMsGcF
VbGsGcFcb
sG
t
s
ct
N
tt
N
t
t
t
s
ct
N
tt
N
t
t
t
t
δ
δ
 
Similarly, 1−tb  is the maximizer in period 1−t . The following inequality holds 
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Rewrite the second inequality as 
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Decompose the above inequality and use the first inequality to get the following inequality 
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Note that both sides of the inequality are the same increasing function that can be written as 
)()( 1 tt bb Π≥Π − , which implies that tt bb ≥−1 . 
 
5. Proof of Proposition 4 
First, I may write the probability of winning as a function of the distribution of bids by 
other bidders, ignoring dependence of other bidders' bids on cost draws. Thus each bidder's 
dynamic game is reduced to a single agent dynamic decision problem where each bidder 
maximizes the discounted sum of future payoffs taking as given the equilibrium bid 
distribution associated with other bidders. Still, this single agent dynamic decision problem 
does involve the latent cost. My second observation is that the first order condition of 
optimal bids gives an explicit expression of the bidder's costs in terms of his equilibrium 
bids and the equilibrium bids distribution. Substituting this expression into the value 
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function yields an expression involving the distribution and the density of equilibrium bids 
only. 
 
6. Proof of Lemma 2 Following Lemma 1, one can easily calculate and get )(sB . 
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Table 4.1 SML Estimates of bid Distribution and Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Variable                     Coef.                               Std. Err. 
dbe 0.0403* 0.0012 
time 0.0051* 0.0002 
np 0.284* 0.0077 
steel 0.274* 0.0066 
length 0.0023* 0.0001 
_cons 11.533* 0.0636 
 2σ   0.054* 0.0016 
*: significant at 5%   
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Table 4.2 Counterfactual Analysis on the Reserve Price Policy 
δ  0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
d* -11992 -8229 -10326 -4498 509
*expected procurement cost under the secret reserve price minus the expected procurement 
cost under the public reserve price 
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Figure 4.1 The Value Function 
 
 111
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
x 106
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
x 106 Equilibrium Bids
cost
bi
d
 
Figure 4.2 The Bidding Function 
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Figure 4.3 The Distribution of Costs 
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